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DISAGGREGATIVE MECHANISMS: MASS CLAIMS
RESOLUTION WITHOUT CLASS ACTIONS
Jaime Dodge∗
ABSTRACT
Aggregation has long been viewed as the primary, if not sole, vehicle for
mass claims resolution. For a half century, scholars have consistently viewed
the consolidated litigation of similar claims as the only mechanism for
efficiently resolving mass claims. In this Article, I challenge that long-standing
and fundamental assumption. This Article seeks to reconceptualize our
understanding of mass claims resolution, arguing that we are witnessing the
birth of a second, unexplored branch of mass claims resolution mechanisms—
which I term “disaggregative” dispute resolution systems because they lack
the traditional judicial aggregation of victims that has been the hallmark of
mass claims litigation.
Disaggregation returns to a focus on the individual akin to that of the
single-plaintiff system, but uses either procedural or substantive streamlining,
or a shift of costs to the defendant, to ameliorate the asymmetries that
prompted the creation of class actions. Many of our most innovative claims
structures—from the BP Gulf Coast Claims Fund and the fund created in the
wake of the Costa Concordia disaster, to the common single-plaintiff
arbitration clauses in consumer and employment agreements—use this new,
bottom-up model of disaggregative mass claims resolution instead of the
familiar top-down aggregative model.
These next-generation systems have been heralded as a significant
advancement in mass claims resolution, capable of awarding greater
compensation to claimants more quickly and at a lower cost than aggregate
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litigation. But like the single-plaintiff and aggregate litigation systems that
preceded it, disaggregation has its flaws. Because the defendant typically
designs these systems, they often give rise to questions about legitimacy and
the accuracy of compensation. Yet, because these systems are the product of
contract, attempts to restrict them have largely failed. This Article tees up not
only the problem these privately ordered processes are creating for the
enforcement of traditional public mechanisms of aggregation, but also the
problems with the public system that drove the private demand for
disaggregation. The Responses to this Article published in the remainder of
this colloquy begin to explore the consequences of this new approach to mass
claims and the array of potential public mechanisms for bringing aggregation
and disaggregation into balance.
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INTRODUCTION
Aggregation was arguably the single most important procedural innovation
of the past century.1 It held the promise of remedying previously irremediable
harms;2 it was the device to which we entrusted our most important cases, from
catastrophic mass torts like Agent Orange3 and asbestos,4 to the school
desegregation of Brown v. Board of Education5 and the quest for workplace
equality.6 Yet, if aggregation was the innovation of the past century, what
could be the innovation of this century?
In recent years, we have increasingly sought to resolve our nation’s greatest
tragedies and harms without aggregate litigation. In the aftermath of the
terrorist attacks, Congress created the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund for the express purpose of removing cases from the traditional litigation
system—insulating the airlines from the costs of defense and streamlining the
costs of public funds dissemination through the creation of a non–Article III
claims tribunal.7 Private defendants have likewise eschewed aggregate
1 See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913,
913 (1998) (“Perhaps the most dramatic development in civil procedure in recent decades has been the growth
of interest in the class action . . . .”); accord John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort
Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1344–45, 1350 (1995); Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters
and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 664 (1979).
2 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (noting that the emergence of aggregate
litigation through Rule 23 was largely an attempt to vindicate “the rights of groups of people who individually
would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all” (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, A
Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
3 In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993).
4 Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. 591.
5 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
7 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006). For similar
programs, see Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. §§ 239–239h (2006)
(Smallpox Compensation Program); Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, id. §§ 247d-6d to -6e
(Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program); Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, id. § 2210
(Radiation Exposure Compensation Program); Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Act of 1976, id. §§ 3796–
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litigation, as exemplified most prominently by the BP Gulf Coast Claims Fund
(GCCF) created in the wake of Deepwater Horizon’s explosion.8
But companies do not only bypass aggregation in addressing national
tragedies and mass disasters. Increasingly, companies seek to avoid
aggregation before and after more ordinary disputes arise as well. With the
Supreme Court’s blessing, companies have begun to include arbitration clauses
as a predispute mechanism for precluding aggregation, ensuring individual
processing of employment9 and small-value consumer claims.10 Putative
defendants have also adopted mass compensation schemes to resolve contract
and mass tort cases, ranging from disputes over seats at the Super Bowl to the
running aground of the Costa Concordia cruise ship, in a postdispute effort to
prevent or weaken postdispute aggregation.11
Yet our scholarship continues to conceive of mass claims resolution
through the lens of aggregate litigation—class actions and, in recent years,
multidistrict litigation and “quasi–class action” settlements.12 As a

3796c-2 (Supp. 2008) (Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Program); Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 1989b-3 (2006).
8 For the official website, see http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com. Although BP would ultimately
reach a class action settlement approved in 2012, it resolved more than two-thirds of its claims—more than
$7.8 billion—through a private claims resolution facility, as required by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. See 33
U.S.C. § 2705(a) (2012). In the wake of the class action settlement, the GCCF website was closed, directing
participants to the class settlement website—a transition discussed in more detail in Parts II and III of this
Article.
9 See, e.g., Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012) (remanding noncompete claims to
arbitration); Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010) (enforcing a provision giving an arbitrator
authority to determine all challenges to enforceability of an arbitration agreement between employee and
employer, in the context of a race discrimination claim).
10 See, e.g., CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012) (holding a dispute over $257 in
credit card fees was properly subject to arbitration because the statute created a right to proceed in class action
litigation but was silent as to whether claims could proceed in arbitration, and thus did not override the Federal
Arbitration Act’s presumption of arbitrability); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)
(holding a $30 dispute was properly subject to a single-plaintiff arbitration agreement).
11 For discussion, see infra Part II.B.
12 When federal civil actions pending in different districts have common questions of fact, multidistrict
litigation (MDL) is utilized to combine and transfer the actions to any district for consolidated pretrial
proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). The new trend within the scholarship has been toward the recognition
of quasi–class action settlement structures through MDL as contrasted with traditional class actions; yet both
mechanisms fall within the traditional conception of aggregation. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,
Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1274–75 (2012); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 370, 371 (2000); Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass Aggregate Litigation, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 962–63 (2012); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi–Class Action Method of
Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 110–11 (2010).
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consequence, many of these innovations are dismissed as ad hoc responses to
extraordinary situations.13
I argue that a far more fundamental transition is underway: We are
witnessing the birth of an entirely new branch of nonaggregative mass claims
resolution systems, of which these mechanisms are mere exemplars.
These emerging systems are based upon a wholly different dispute
resolution methodology than those described in the existing literature—one
that bypasses the determination of common questions, at the core of aggregate
mechanisms, entirely.14 Instead, these mechanisms use individualized claims
determination as the vehicle for mass claims resolution.15 I therefore term this
new, second, unexplored branch of mass claims resolution mechanisms
“disaggregative” dispute resolution systems. While “disaggregation” has
typically referred to the breaking down of an aggregate class into smaller
subclasses,16 this Article posits a far more radical form of disaggregation, in
which the would-be class is broken into individual claims. The consequences
of this pure disaggregation are far more extreme, but also create a very

13 See, e.g., Tracy A. Thomas, Introduction to Symposium, Remedies for Big Disasters: The BP Gulf Oil
Spill and the Quest for Complete Justice, 45 AKRON L. REV. 567, 570 (2012) (summarizing the conclusion of
symposium participants that the GCCF should not serve as a template for other disasters or compensation
programs); Adam S. Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, 59 DUKE L.J. 1105, 1114, 1118 (2010) (attributing
the lack of scholarship on public funds to the conception that they are “sui generis” products of “special
legislation”).
For studies of particular tribunals, see KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE
UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 (2005); Robert M. Ackerman, The September
11th Victim Compensation Fund: An Effective Administrative Response to National Tragedy, 10 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 135 (2005); Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Future Harm in the Context of September 11, 88
VA. L. REV. 1831 (2002); Byron G. Stier, The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as Quasi-Public Fund:
Transparency and Independence in Claim Administrator Compensation, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 255 (2011).
14 Leading scholars are now focused upon doctrinal trends within aggregation toward smaller classes and
multidistrict litigation—what I suggest here is a far more fundamental shift in mass claims resolution. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 667 (2013) (discussing the trend toward
smaller classes); Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial By Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571 (2012).
15 See Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1361,
1380–81 (2005) (“Except for the option of individual trials, all of the currently available litigation procedures
for an endgame in disputes involving large numbers of claims contemplate a claims resolution facility. [Rule
23 federal class actions], state class actions, bankruptcy, multidistrict litigation, and mass settlements all reach
closure with a claims resolution facility.”).
16 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 93 (2011) (using the term “disaggregation” to reference
the Dukes Court’s insistence on smaller classes and Concepcion’s upholding of predispute arbitration
provisions that effectively barred aggregation, noting that both opinions “insisted on disaggregation,
devolution, and privatization”).

DODGE GALLEYSPROOFS

1258

6/30/2014 1:55 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:1253

different set of normative concerns than the more restricted form of
disaggregation occurring within the public aggregation mechanisms.17
The public class action device contributed to “a sea change in our
understanding of both substantive and procedural law,”18 generating an entirely
new field of legal scholarship.19 The rise of private disaggregation has the
potential to create an equally dramatic shift in the legal landscape, as this new
approach to dispute resolution is driving many of the most innovative claims
structures emerging today.20
In the mass claims context, individual plaintiffs often lack the incentive to
bring suit, and where they do bring suit, they often rationally underinvest in
litigation compared to the defendant.21 This resource asymmetry led to the
creation of aggregation mechanisms, but created a new set of undesirable
results, from nuisance suits to sweetheart deals.22 Disaggregative mechanisms
are thus a next-generation attempt to correct the resource asymmetries of the
single-plaintiff era, without generating the familiar problems of aggregation.
Disaggregative systems often streamline procedure or substantive inquiries,
or shift the costs of litigation to the defendants, allowing the pursuit of claims
that could not rationally be pursued in the pre–Rule 23 world because the
litigation costs exceeded the potential recovery.23 As a result, there is no need
17

See infra Part II.
Shapiro, supra note 1, at 914.
19 Id. at 914–16 & n.2 (querying whether any law review existed that had not published an article on
class actions and providing an excellent index of the leading works within the field).
20 For a traditional discussion of disaggregation as a mechanism for effectuating global class settlement,
see Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 747, 751 (2002) (discussing the asbestos, silicone gel breast implant, and fen-phen class settlements,
which he noted “all aspire to create some form of private administrative system that . . . promises more
efficient compensation for plaintiffs, long-term peace for defendants, and a reduced litigation burden for the
courts”).
21 See Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Mandatory
Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1859–60 (2004).
22 See infra notes 98–103 and accompanying text. See generally RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN
A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 11–54 (2007) (discussing the dynamics of mass tort litigation and dysfunctions that
arise in this context).
23 See infra Part III.A. Effective in 1966, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set the
prerequisites for class certification, as well as the types of classes permitted and their respective requirements.
1 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:8, at 28–29 (4th ed. 2002). The
accompanying advisory committee notes explained the rationale for this innovation, focusing largely on the
risk of inconsistent judgments and the need for classwide relief in discrimination cases. FED. R. CIV. P. 23
advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 98–102 (1966).
But, today’s class action practice focuses far more on these cost asymmetries, which can prevent either
the pursuit of a claim or the successful pursuit of a claim. See David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class
18

DODGE GALLEYSPROOFS

2014]

6/30/2014 1:55 PM

DISAGGREGATIVE MECHANISMS

1259

for the aggregation of claims; each individual can autonomously decide
whether to pursue relief or not. This structure has the consequence of removing
the agency relationship inherent to class litigation24—and with it the
substantial costs aggregation entails,25 allowing the settlement of cases that
could not be certified for class treatment consistent with due process.26
As a result, these features of disaggregation create the possibility for
claimants not only to receive compensation more quickly but also to receive
more compensation than would have been available in aggregation.27 Yet, even
where this supercompensation is offered, defendants may see a decrease in
overall costs, as litigation costs and free riding decline.28 Thus, disaggregation
holds the laudable promise of a simultaneous, superior, win-win outcome for
both parties by eliminating the systemic costs and delays inherent to aggregate
litigation—suggesting that these mechanisms may become a more common
feature in our legal system in the years to come.29
But it is already foreseeable that disaggregation will also generate a new set
of deviations from our preferred outcomes, like the single-plaintiff and
aggregate litigation structures that preceded it.30 While aggregation is often
described as one of the most controversial features of our litigation system,

Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 852–53 (2002). For an excellent
introduction for the unfamiliar reader to the phases of class litigation and the settlement pressures and
“dysfunctions” apparent at each phase of litigation, see generally NAGAREDA, supra note 22, at 11–54.
24 See Burch, supra note 12, at 1274–81 (discussing agency problems in both class actions and MDL and
the possibility of third-party financiers acting as monitors in the context of nonclass aggregative litigation to
help manage principal–agent problems); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s
Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (1991) (discussing agency in the context of Rule 23 class litigation and the agency costs
unique to aggregate litigation). See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Litigation Funding and the Problem of
Agency Cost in Representative Actions, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 561 (2014) (discussing the agency costs inherent in
representative actions and the potential impact of alternative litigation financing).
25 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997) (noting that the transaction costs
exceeded recovery in the asbestos cases by a two-to-one ratio).
26 See id. at 597–98 (holding the class settlement proposing global resolution of current and future claims
could not be certified consistent with due process, but noting that lack of certification meant that “future
claimants may lose altogether” given the specter of exhaustion of assets).
27 See infra Part II.B.
28 See infra Part II.C.
29 Cf. John H. Beisner et al., Class Action “Cops”: Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1441, 1444–57 (2005) (discussing distrust of class actions by the public and the impact upon the
selection and settlement of lawsuits).
30 See NAGAREDA, supra note 22, at 11–54.
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attracting more scholarly attention than almost any other,31 disaggregation may
become even more controversial.32
Disaggregation has the potential to substantially limit the experiment with
aggregation that has occurred over the past half century—giving defendants no
less than the option to avoid class actions altogether. The Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts, in both their procedural33 and substantive34 rulings, have
already focused on the due process limitations on aggregation, chipping away
at the potential expanse of aggregation.35 But now, disaggregation gives
private parties the power to chip away at aggregation from the opposite end of
the spectrum: Pre-dispute, contracting parties can use arbitration provisions to
waive aggregation—preventing the pursuit of any future class action.36 Postdispute, defendants in contract and tort actions alike can now use
disaggregative settlements not just to deter the filing of a class action, but to
prevent a class action altogether.37
The primary carveout to this newly emerging doctrine exists where the
damages incurred are subject to debate, such that the court can find that the

31 See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State
Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 488 (2012) (“Few aspects of contemporary civil litigation have
attracted as much scholarly attention as the damages class action. Commentators have criticized class actions
as either too powerful or not powerful enough . . . .”(footnote omitted)); Richard A. Nagareda, Class
Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 97 (2009) (“Few pretrial motions in our
civil justice system elicit as much controversy as those for the certification of class actions.”); Sergio J.
Campos, Class Actions All the Way Down, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 20, 20 (2013), http://www.
columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/20_Campos.pdf (“[T]he class action [is] arguably the
most controversial procedure in civil litigation.”).
32 See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern
Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 373–79 (2005) (predicting with disappointment the end of the class
action procedure as a result of “the demise of mass tort class actions and the rise of contractual class action
waivers”); Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as a Means for Resolving
Mass Tort Claims—A Fund Too Far, 71 LA. L. REV. 819, 825 (2011) (criticizing one such “defendant-created
and directed” disaggregative device as “a model essentially unconstrained by law”); Resnik, supra note 16, at
161–68 (critiquing recent Supreme Court decisions that subsequently imposed greater entry barriers to federal
courts through disaggregation).
33 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560–61 (2011); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619–22 (1997).
34 See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353–63 (2007); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003).
35 See, e.g., Burch, supra note 14, at 667; Resnik supra note 16, at 93.
36 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746–53 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681–89 (2010).
37 See, e.g., Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 681 F.3d 1208, 1210–15 (10th Cir. 2012); In re
Aqua Dots Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 751–53 (7th Cir. 2011).
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corporation has not offered full compensation in its disaggregative process.38
Yet, in many cases the same individualized inquiries that interfere with
damages may also drive variation in liability or manageability questions
sufficient to preclude class certification.39 Thus, private disaggregative
mechanisms may have the greatest power in shielding defendants in the cases
that were the last stand of the class action system. The confluence of this early
precedent then suggests that, unless we change the direction of our doctrine, if
the defendant prefers to avoid a class action it can readily use disaggregative
mechanisms to do so. The practical impact of this innovation is the radical
notion that we are on the precipice of a world in which many class actions may
be maintained only with the defendant’s blessing.
In the shadows of this broader systemic shift lurk concerns with the
operation of these private mechanisms. In the shadow of aggregation, the
particular outcomes obtained have the potential to either substantially
undercompensate or overcompensate claimants.40 These consequences flow in
part from the bypassing of merits determinations that many disaggregative
processes formally employ or informally incentivize.41 But these outcomes are
also the result of a process that is typically defendant driven, with the
defendant acting as the systems designer, not only crafting the rules of the
game but also selecting the umpire who will make the calls—giving rise to
substantial legitimacy questions.42
The existing literature typically frames this dynamic as a conflict between
party autonomy and private ordering on the one hand,43 and enforcement of
38 See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on April 20, 2010,
295 F.R.D. 112, 161 (E.D. La. 2013) (certifying class and approving class settlement).
39 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550–52, 2557 (2011) (reversing a decision to
certify a class for a lack of commonality among the 1.5 million members, and finding their claims for backpay
to have been improperly certified under Rule 23(b)(2)).
40 See infra Part III.A.
41 For an excellent discussion of the normative consequences of a privately ordered shift toward minimal
process in the single-plaintiff context, see Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 805 (2011).
42 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631,
1631–35 (2005).
43 See, e.g., Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of
Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 922–23 (2010); Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement
Class Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 5, 13–15), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2243155; Deborah E. Greenspan & Matthew A. Neuburger, Settle or
Sue? The Use and Structure of Alternative Compensation Programs in the Mass Claims Context, 17 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 97, 129–36 (2012); Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims:
An Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 248 (2000).

DODGE GALLEYSPROOFS

1262

6/30/2014 1:55 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:1253

substantive law, social justice, and the larger public interest on the other.44 Yet
those seeking to restrict disaggregation have struggled to find a legal basis to
do so, and, more broadly, to reconcile such a restriction with the default rule
permitting parties to settle their claims without court approval or
intervention.45
This Article reconceptualizes this conflict, arguing that the privatized
nature of the existing disaggregation system is the source of many of the
problems identified.46 Thus, while parties elect private disaggregative
mechanisms because they yield better outcomes than the default litigation
system, in many disputes a public disaggregative mechanism would offer a
superior option. Yet no public mechanism exists.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the systemic costs and
failures of public aggregation mechanisms that gave rise to disaggregation.
Part II introduces the concept of private disaggregation, and then sets forth a
typology of existing disaggregative systems. Part III explores the consequences
of disaggregation for the twin goals of compensation and deterrence, as well as
the broader public interest in the availability of legitimate and transparent
processes. In contrast to the existing literature, this Part argues that a web of
interrelated factors—including the size, similarity, and sophistication of the
population seeking relief—can create a bias favoring not only defendants but
also claimants. This analysis suggests that current limits on disaggregation,
while well intentioned, do not obtain optimal results. Finally, this Article offers
a few concluding observations on the impact the innovation of private
disaggregation has upon our ability to rely upon private rights of action as a
mechanism for enforcement of law.

44 See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-compete
Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 379–80, 383 (2006); Mullenix,
supra note 32, at 825; Resnik, supra note 16, at 161–68; Adriaan Lanni, Note, Protecting Public Rights in
Private Arbitration, 107 YALE L.J. 1157, 1161 (1998).
45 See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012); David Horton, Mass Arbitration and Democratic
Legitimacy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (reviewing MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE
FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013)), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2235901.
46 See infra Part III.
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I. THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION OF DISAGGREGATION AS A HANDMAIDEN
OF AGGREGATION
A. The Necessity of Disaggregation in Mass Claims Compensation
Scholars have long debated the optimal dispute resolution structure for
processing mass claims. The inherent challenge stems from the realization that
single-plaintiff litigation results in suboptimal levels of compensation and
deterrence where wrongs are perpetrated on a large scale.47 The emergence of
aggregate litigation through Rule 23 was thus largely an attempt to vindicate
“the rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective
strength to bring their opponents into court at all.”48 Through aggregation, the
asymmetrical investment incentives that would otherwise exist could be
corrected, encouraging both parties to make an optimal investment in the
litigation process.49 Aggregation held the promise of not only improved
enforcement and deterrence, but also more systematic treatment of wrongs and
greater consistency across similarly situated victims,50 with more efficiency
than individualized litigation.51
Despite its promise, aggregation could only resolve the common questions
of litigation; it could not determine individual-specific elements of a claim,
defenses, or damages.52 Thus, disaggregation became a crucial feature of
aggregation-based mechanisms for dispute resolution.53 The dynamics of class
actions—and aggregation generally—almost inevitably lead to a high
probability of settlement prior to trial, given the stakes for both sides in the allor-nothing verdict at trial and the intensive resource allocation class litigation
47 See Nagareda, supra note 20, at 751, 754, 770, 821 (“[T]he existence of a credible mass tort class
settlement removes the possibility of a deterrence gap by virtually eliminating the prospect that too few
compensation claims will be filed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The nature of these claims can vary
widely as the problem of vindication is quintessentially one of the ratio of damages to litigation costs, such that
even high-value claims can fall within this category. See id. at 750. Mass tort claims are an exemplar, as the
alleged damages may include substantial claims for personal injury or wrongful death, but establishing
causation may require the costly development of epidemiological evidence, expert testimony, and voluminous
document review. See id. at 750, 827.
48 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Kaplan, supra note 2, at 497).
49 See Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 852.
50 See Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 308, 382 (1996).
51 See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 135–36 (1995) (describing
the efficiency benefits of aggregation).
52 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560–61 (2011) (holding that the defendant has a
due process right to present individualized defenses in a class action proceeding).
53 See McGovern, supra note 15, at 1380–81.
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requires.54 Disaggregation has therefore become the mechanism for
distributing the proceeds of a settlement to individual class members.55
Modern class settlements looked to the public law model of disaggregation,
creating eligibility and compensation frameworks in the settlement agreement
akin to those embedded in the congressional authorizations of public
tribunals.56 Claims settlement facilities are then employed to distribute
individual compensatory awards pursuant to those frameworks.57 Because
claims facilities have received little scholarly attention, a brief introduction is
useful in understanding the operation of the existing aggregate system, the
impetus it creates toward disaggregation, and the ways in which disaggregation
can enlarge the pool of funds available to the parties—allowing both sides to
simultaneously receive a superior net outcome as contrasted with
aggregation.58
B. The Class Action Settlement Process
Once the court has approved a class settlement, as required by Rule 23, an
administrator is typically engaged to provide class notices and manage the
claims fund. The small cadre of leading settlement administration firms has
developed best practices for managing the complex operational details that
frequently emerge during the notice and distribution processes. There are
generally two roles incorporated within this function: (1) determining whether
the individual is properly entitled to participation in the settlement, and (2)
determining the proper amount of compensation and overseeing its provision.

54 See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.) (describing
certification as “forcing these defendants to stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial” or “to
settle even if they have no legal liability” out of “fear of the risk of bankruptcy”). But see Stephen B. Burbank
& Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 59–
61 (2010) (“What is striking . . . is Judge Posner’s lack of attention in the first part of his analysis to the policy
differences that States might have regarding the ‘mature tort’ problem and the relative merits of decentralized
adjudication, which offers the benefit of accreted wisdom over time but may produce results that lack
uniformity and appear arbitrary, versus a high-stakes industry-wide trial, which creates greater risks of
inaccurate or unreliable results but also provides greater parity and fairness among claimants.”).
55 See Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 507–12 (2011).
56 See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 921
(1996).
57 See McGovern, supra note 15, at 1365.
58 See Deborah R. Hensler, Alternative Courts? Litigation-Induced Claims Resolution Facilities, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (2005) (noting that claims resolution facilities have “largely escaped the scrutiny of
legal scholars”).
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The predominant form of aggregate settlement provides for an allocationonly function, in which the claims administrator allocates a defined fund
among claimants.59 Typical allocation structures include flat rate, in which all
claimants receive the same relief; flat-rate election, in which all claimants are
given the choice among a small number of remedies; and formula or grid
structures, in which certain predefined criteria are used to calculate the
compensation due.60 While one could envision a system in which the
administrator is given the discretion to make an individualized determination,
both parties typically favor providing clear guidance to the administrator.
Moreover, this clarity is useful in demonstrating to the court that the absent
class members have enough information about their likely recovery to make
informed decisions about participation.61 As a result, most settlements adopt a
clear payout formula.
1. Barriers to Compensation
In recent years, claims forms have become a common feature in
settlements, whether because of difficulties in determining the identity or
location of class members to send payment or because of potential variations in
the harm suffered by the class.62 While a class action binds all members of the
class, only the fraction who submit claims forms receive compensation where
such a form is required. A recent study by Rust Consulting—one of the
preeminent settlement administration firms—found that the claims form
completion rate is approximately 2%–20% in consumer cases, while higher
rates are obtained in securities cases (20%–35%) and employment cases (20%–
85%).63 As a matter of best practices, there is pressure for courts to ensure that
claims forms are actually necessary in any particular case—either to identify
the individual or determine the amount of compensation due.64 Nevertheless,

59

See Zimmerman, supra note 55, at 511–12.
See Francis E. McGovern, Distribution of Funds in Class Actions—Claims Administration, 35 J. CORP.
L. 123, 126–33 (2009) (describing various settlement structures as case studies, without creating a typology).
61 Cf. McGovern, supra note 15, at 1376–77 (recognizing the tensions inherent in requiring opt-out
before awards are calculated).
62 See Judges’ Class Action Notice and Claims Process Checklist and Plain Language Guide, FED. JUD.
CTR. 6 (2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/NotCheck.pdf/$file/NotCheck.pdf (treating claim
forms as a common practice).
63 See Tiffany Allen, Anticipating Claims Filing Rates in Class Action Settlements, CLASS ACTION
PERSP. (Rust Consulting, Inc., Minneapolis, Minn.), Nov. 2008, available at http://www.rustconsulting.com/
Portals/0/pdf/Monograph_ClaimsFilingRates.pdf.
64 See Judges’ Class Action Notice and Claims Process Checklist and Plain Language Guide, supra note
62, at 6.
60
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this leads to the astonishing notion that many class actions are only providing
compensation to a small fraction of the harmed individuals, while preclusion
operates to bar the remaining individuals’ claims.65
Equally notable, the structure of class actions requires that absent class
members be given the choice not only to file a claim form, but also to opt out
of the settlement and retain their right to sue individually, or object to the
settlement altogether.66 While these options promote due process and
autonomy, the practical result is often confusion among absent class members
who, confronted with various forms, complete the wrong paperwork—for
example, opting out of the settlement when they intend to accept payment.67 In
one notable case, 10,000 claims forms were filed, but 20,000 requests for
exclusion were filed.68
2. Fixed-Fund Versus Claims-Made Settlements
In these structures there remains a question of precisely what compensation
will be determined to be due, and successfully paid, given the high probability
of absent class members who fail to file claims forms or even cash checks
mailed to their last known addresses.69 Therefore, the establishment of a total
fund in the settlement agreement is common.70 Innovative multitiered payment
schedules can be utilized to minimize the residual, but typically the balance

65 See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07 (2010)
(recommending judges limit such payments “to circumstances in which direct distribution to individual class
members is not economically feasible, or where funds remain after class members are given a full opportunity
to make a claim” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
This observation does not account for the practice of settling class claims without even attempting to
make distribution to the class—a phenomenon that has troubled class action scholars who view the practice as
an abandonment of one’s duty to the class in favor of a charitable group comprised of individuals who are not
clients (but are instead, for example, political allies). Yet, lawyers have argued that in small-value cases the
transaction costs of payment can exceed damages. See Lemos, supra note 31, at 528–29 (describing objections
to cy pres distributions and documenting examples of politically directed cy pres recoveries).
66 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3), (e)(4).
67 McGovern, supra note 60, at 127.
68 Id. at 126–27.
69 Five to twenty-five percent of checks issued in class actions remain uncashed. See Class Notice &
Settlement Administration: Avoiding the Pitfalls—Part I, CLASS ACTION PERSP. (Rust Consulting, Inc.,
Minneapolis, Minn.), Mar. 2007, available at http://www.rustconsulting.com/Portals/0/pdf/Monograph_
Pitfalls_I.pdf.
70 With improved technology, some funds have been able to make automatic payments to all class
members. However, these payment structures require substantial information about claimants, which is
frequently unavailable. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 1167.
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will ultimately be donated to charity through a cy pres distribution.71 A total
settlement fund benefits both the defendant and the class counsel. For the
defendant, this provides certainty to financial markets about the extent of
liability, a step commonly regarded as advantageous to stock price.72 For the
class counsel, this provides a ready benchmark by which the court can measure
the counsel’s success, a key component in the determination of attorneys’
fees.73
Yet notable outliers exist. For example, Congress gave the special master
administering the September 11th Compensation Fund the ability to determine
the overall size of the claims fund.74 Similarly, the silicone gel breast implant
settlement is one of the most prominent examples of a private fund utilizing
this model, as private defendants typically demand certainty and global peace
in exchange for their agreement to settle.75 In that case, defendants in an MDL
proceeding agreed to form a “claims-made” fund, in which those individuals
submitting claims and meeting the established criteria would receive payments
according to a defined schedule.76 The unlimited fund feature of these
programs can be a useful bridge in negotiations, particularly where counsel
cannot agree upon the likely value and number of claims—and thus cannot
reach agreement on the derivative total settlement figure.77
But, arbitraging this asymmetry in expectations does include risk. If the
damages are greater than expected, there is no cap or pro rata cramdown as is

71 A cy pres distribution occurs when class damages cannot be feasibly distributed or when a balance
remains; under this system, the funds are to be distributed to the next best compensation use, typically a
charitable donation. See 4 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 23, § 11:20. For an excellent discussion of the cy
pres system, see William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57
VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2159–71 (2004).
72 Francis E. McGovern, A Model State Mass Tort Settlement Statute, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1809, 1811–12
(2006).
73 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory
for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677–84
(1986) (describing fee structures and incentives for class counsel).
74 For varied analysis, see Symposium, After Disaster: The September 11th Compensation Fund and the
Future of Civil Justice, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 205 (2003).
75 See McGovern, supra note 15, at 1363–64 (discussing the September 11th Compensation Fund and
silicone gel breast implant settlements as exemplars of funds that do not establish overall fund limits but
instead “the total amount of damages would be the sum of the subsequently determined individual amounts”).
76 Settlement Facility and Fund Distribution Agreement Between Dow Corning Corporation and the
Claimants’ Advisory Committee at 2–3, In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 705 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999)
(No. 95-20512).
77 See McGovern, supra note 60, at 1389.
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provided for in any potentially undercapitalized fixed-fund settlement.78 If the
liability is too great, it may risk bankrupting the involved defendants—as
occurred in the asbestos and breast implant litigation contexts.79 While
bankruptcy does not bar recovery, it may require presentment of claims and set
cutoff dates that are impossible for those with latent claims to meet, resulting
in diminished or permissive payout structures—the reality faced by many
breast implant claimants.80 For these reasons, claims-made funds have
generally been disfavored by counsel to both parties. Claims-made funds thus
remain a tool most commonly used by public institutions seeking to effectuate
broader instrumental goals, transcending the immediate resolution of claims.
3. The Hidden Costs of Fixed Funds
The prevalence of fixed-fund structures then creates an allocation problem
in all but the simplest cases. In order to reach agreement upon an aggregate
total, either the amount of each absent class member’s claim must be
determined in advance, or the administrator must be given power to ascertain
these awards. Determining a binding claim value in advance requires counsel
to ascertain the relevant variables to compensation and reach agreement on the
details of compensation at a micro level. But, often parties are instead
incentivized to simply agree to an overall settlement figure first, then later
reach agreement on how that fund should be allocated. As a result, rather than
having a bottom-up settlement that reflects the aggregate value of the
individual claims, the settlement is a top-down settlement in which claimants
effectively compete for allocation of a fixed-fund. Moreover, in high-profile
settlements in which objections are anticipated from outside plaintiffs’ firms,
errors or omissions in defining these variables may lead to denial of the motion
to approve the class settlement.81

78 For an excellent discussion of undercapitalization and the resulting need for a second opt-out
opportunity, see Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Scientific Authority: The Breast Implant Litigation and
Beyond, 86 VA. L. REV. 801, 803–07 (2000).
79 Anthony J. Sebok, What Do We Talk About When We Talk About Mass Torts?, 106 MICH. L. REV.
1213, 1213 (2008) (reviewing NAGAREDA, supra note 22).
80 See Agreed Order Allowing Certain Late Claimants Limited Rights to Participate in the Plan’s
Settlement Facility at 3, In re Dow Corning Corp., No. CV-00005-DPH (E.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2007), available
at http://www.mied.uscourts.gov/Information/Dow/pdf/orderpdf/agreed%20Order.pdf.
81 See William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53
UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1459 (2006) (concluding that “the track record of professional objectors to date . . . has
been less than stellar”).
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In contrast, if the parties seek to reach agreement on an overall figure
without providing a specific formula for allocation of compensation using
already-known variables, undercapitalization is possible. Indeed, the initial
silicone gel breast implant settlement suffered from precisely this defect,
resulting in a cramdown, or ratcheting, of the absent class members’ awards
and triggering a second opt-out opportunity for the class members.82 Because
of the potential for undercapitalization, it is at times a “best practice” to
withhold payment of class members’ claims until all payments have been
calculated in order to ensure that sufficient monies exist to satisfy all awards at
the same pro rata payout percentage.
Withholding in turn creates another set of tradeoffs: delaying payments in
full requires claimants to wait until the conclusion of the proceedings to
receive monies that may be needed immediately for resulting medical
treatment and other expenses. However, creating a multi-tranche payout
scheme increases administrative costs, limiting the pool of resources available
for the settlement. These dynamics make clear that in fixed-fund cases, there
may be real conflict among class members who are, de facto, competing for a
share of the fund.
4. Settlement Motivations and Agency Costs
Given this complexity, why is it that disaggregation has been viewed as a
mere ministerial detail?83 For defendants, as deterrence theory suggests, the
dominant consideration in settlements is the total payout and the degree of
closure they will receive in exchange for that payment.84 For class counsel,
fees are calculated based upon the overall aggregate recovery.85 Thus, for both
sets of counsel, so long as the allocation is not so unfair as to prompt a high
opt-out rate or later collateral attack, there is no structural incentive to invest
additional resources in improved allocation mechanisms.86
82

Walker & Monahan, supra note 78, at 803–07.
See Hensler, supra note 58, at 1429, 1439 (lamenting the lack of scholarship on claims administration).
84 See Nagareda, supra note 56, at 914 (“From the defendants’ standpoint . . . settlement is attractive only
to the extent that it does not merely resolve pending cases but, in addition, provides assurance that such action
will not result in a deluge of marginal cases.”).
85 See Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs’ Counsel in Allocating
Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1527 (1998).
86 For a discussion of the agency dynamics that drive class settlement allocations between class
members, see generally Samuel Issacharoff et al., Bargaining Impediments and Settlement Behavior, in
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BRIDGING THE SETTLEMENT GAP (David A. Anderson ed., 1996); Marcel Kahan &
Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA,
Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765 (1998); Silver & Baker, supra note 85.
83
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The incentive is therefore toward creating the broadest possible class in
settlement, which provides greater closure to the defendant and enhances the
attorneys’ fees award to class counsel—a structural incentive checked only by
increasingly stringent court review. However, the structure of settlement
approval hearings necessarily operates so that counsel for both sides are
unified in their desire to obtain approval, thus minimizing any issues appearing
before the court.87
Moreover, absent class members often lack not only the incentive, but also
the discovery necessary to uncover these differences, given the negative-value
considerations that prompted the initial creation of aggregation. Thus, unless a
competing plaintiffs’ firm seeks to appear as counsel for an objecting party as a
means of preventing settlement or gaining a seat at the negotiating table—a
dynamic that typically occurs in only the largest settlements, but is unlikely in
most class actions—the Rule 23 structure does not result in any actor with both
the incentive and ability to raise these conflicts to the court.88
C. The Impetus for Privatization
In the existing public litigation system, disaggregation is simply a
mechanism for implementing an aggregate settlement. While the aggregate
settlement figure may reflect a proper deterrent value, the individual
settlements that result in its shadow may fail to provide an accurate level of
compensation because of the emphasis on collective treatment and
minimization of administrative costs. Yet, for an absent class member, opting
out of the settlement will mean litigating the claim individually or with the
handful of other opt-outs—frequently a negative-value proposition.89 The
rational choice for an absent class member is then to remain in the aggregate
settlement, even if it is substantially undercompensating his or her losses. Yet
this dynamic suggests the possibility from the claimant’s perspective of a more
optimal compensation system focused upon disaggregated compensation,
rather than aggregate deterrence.90

87

See Rubenstein, supra note 81, at 1445.
See generally Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV.
287, 370–71 (2003) (describing the lack of meaningful checks imposed by objections upon disloyal class
counsel).
89 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
288, 304–05 (2010).
90 See David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class
Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1871–79 (2002).
88

DODGE GALLEYSPROOFS

2014]

6/30/2014 1:55 PM

DISAGGREGATIVE MECHANISMS

1271

II. THE NEW GENERATION OF DISAGGREGATIVE STRUCTURES
Aggregation promised to ameliorate the irremediability of certain types of
harms, to create improved deterrence for widespread but negative-value
wrongs, and to correct the asymmetries inherent to the single-plaintiff litigation
system that emerged in the context of mass claims. Yet the solution of
aggregation created its own well-documented costs resulting from the
additional procedural protections aggregation entailed, a new set of
dislocations91 in settlement values, and ultimately dysfunction harmful to
plaintiffs and defendants alike. In the intervening decades, scholars and
lawmakers have proposed countless modifications, expansions, and alterations
to the aggregate litigation system designed to ameliorate these dislocations, but
the underlying dysfunction remains.
In this Part, I argue that disaggregation is emerging as a new approach to
mass claims resolution, creating a new set of dispute resolution mechanisms
distinct from those of aggregation. This Part outlines the sources of parties’
dissatisfaction with the traditional aggregative process, which created the
conditions that fostered the birth of these new private mechanisms. The
analysis then turns to the ways in which procedural and substantive
streamlining operate, identifying the situations in which parties should elect
these mechanisms as superior to the public litigation and aggregation systems.
Disaggregation is already the mechanism by which every award of
compensation to a mass claims victim is made. Disaggregation is essential
even in aggregative proceedings because an individual’s status as a victim
eligible for compensation must, by definition, be determined on an individual
basis.92 Disaggregation has therefore traditionally been employed as a
91 For every claim, there is an optimal point of both compensation and deterrence associated with the
value of the claim. Determining this optimal point within the law is, in the first instance, a matter for the
legislature in crafting the available remedies, but then requires substantial individualized discovery and
assessment to determine the precise value of any particular legal right in a particular case. In addition, scholars
will often argue that particular legal frameworks are not obtaining the optimal levels of compensation or
deterrence given particular normative goals.
This Article argues that there are a number of factors that can shift settlement values from these
optimal points, wherever set. The term “dislocation” is used throughout my analysis to show that these shifts
are bilateral, in contrast with the traditional terminology that often suggests a merely one-directional shift from
this optimal value point.
92 The use of disaggregation, even in this traditional setting, has “largely escaped the scrutiny of legal
scholars.” Hensler, supra note 58, at 1429, 1439 (“It is time to get serious about understanding the role claims
resolution facilities are playing in the delivery of civil justice in the United States.”). But see Georgene Vairo,
Why Me? The Role of Private Trustees in Complex Claims Resolution, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1391, 1392–93 (2005)
(advocating for the use of administrative trusts run by private persons).
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handmaiden of aggregation. But I argue that today parties are engaging in a
trend of “responsive opt-out,” in which they contractually bypass aggregation
altogether, employing disaggregation not as a mere handmaiden but as the
mechanism for reaching settlement.
In recent years, controversy has swirled around predispute arbitration
agreements and postdispute settlement offers made by defendants to undermine
class actions, as exemplified most prominently by the BP Gulf Coast Claims
Fund.93 I argue that these mechanisms are each instantiations of a new trend
toward disaggregative systems design, as defendants have increasingly realized
that reliance upon disaggregation as a substitute for aggregative mechanisms
can yield vastly superior outcomes in contrast with the default public litigation
system. This reconceptualization reveals that disaggregation is not limited to
its traditional role as a handmaiden to aggregation, but is instead a new,
second, and co-equal, but heretofore unexplored, branch of mass claims
systems design—rivaling the field of aggregation.
In this new world, parties are no longer merely selecting among the
available mechanisms for aggregation within our public litigation system. This
emerging innovation in the pre- and postdispute use of disaggregation reflects
a grassroots realization that in certain cases the costs of aggregation to the
parties, in both outlays to third parties and the costs derivative of uncertainty
and a delay in settlement, will at times be greater than the initial difference in
claims valuation between the parties. The result is such that seriatim,
individual settlement is superior to undertaking the costs of aggregation,
particularly given that disaggregation remains the endgame of aggregate
settlements.
These new disaggregative mechanisms are thus able to remove not only the
high procedural costs that aggregation entails for the protection of both absent
class members and defendants, but also to unwind the transformation of the
bargaining process that aggregation yields. Moreover, for defendants,
postdispute disaggregative settlements may offer substantial public relations
benefits as they attempt to “make right” a wrong, while simultaneously
reassuring shareholders about the company’s ability to quickly resolve the
pending liability. These second-generation opt-out structures have generated
substantial controversy, framed alternatively as incredibly innovative and
efficient mechanisms superior in their results for both parties, or as

93

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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unconscionable procedural mechanisms created by corporations to exploit
victims and externalize the costs of their tortious or otherwise illegal behavior.
To be clear, my claim is not that aggregation has no value. Rather, that
from a systems design perspective, it yields suboptimal outcomes for the
parties with respect to particular types of claims. For this reason, I argue, we
see a trend toward disaggregation not only in private party disputes but also in
public mass claims tribunals. While the motivations of the parties and, in turn,
the necessity of external limitations are inherently very different in the public
and private contexts, I reserve this issue for the later Parts of this Article. In
this Part, I only seek to establish the existence of this branch of disaggregative
mass claims resolution mechanisms and begin to identify the situations in
which parties may turn to disaggregative tribunals.
The consequences of this investigation are significant. This transition
toward private ordering creates a new, second branch of dispute resolution
mechanisms and scholarship. But, it also has substantial implications for our
aggregate litigation scholarship. In the design of public aggregate litigation
mechanisms we must no longer focus exclusively upon the ability of the rules
to create optimal outcomes in the trial, or settlement, of mass claims. Rather,
parties are increasingly treating these mechanisms as mere default rules—as a
starting point in negotiation for a disaggregative process. Yet the question of
whether aggregation rules are optimal, not as mandatory rules but instead as
default rules, has been largely overlooked in the literature.
A. Basic Typology
As the preceding discussion suggests, despite aggregate litigation’s promise
of correcting asymmetries and promoting efficiency, the reality was far
different. Aggregation surely provided a benefit and helpful innovation over
the single-plaintiff and joinder systems that preceded it. Yet, these firstgeneration mass claims aggregation mechanisms entailed substantial costs,94
which could easily swamp even high-value litigation recoveries.95 At the same
time, limitations on the benefits of aggregation became apparent, as protecting
the due process rights of absent class members limited the scope and content of

94 For an excellent discussion of agency in Rule 23 classes and MDL, see Macey & Miller, supra note
24, at 7–8.
95 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997).
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settlements—and in turn the degree of closure provided to defendants.96 In
imposing these restrictions, the Supreme Court recognized the intractable
problems this presented in mass claims resolution: In certain types of cases,
global aggregate settlements could not be approved consistent with due
process, while continued litigation was not only value destructive, but would
create a new set of dislocations as claimants were forced to rush to the
courthouse before the remaining funds were dissipated.97
As sophistication with the tools of aggregation increased, sources of
structural dysfunction became apparent at all phases of the claims maturation
process. Settlements drifted away from their optimal value—a trend
exemplified by the nuisance litigation,98 blackmail settlements,99 and
sweetheart deals100 that evolved in the shadow of aggregation.101 The
settlements occurring in the shadow of aggregate litigation predictably were
contaminated by this dysfunction, triggering a widespread critique of
aggregation as providing suboptimal levels of both compensation and
deterrence.102 Sadly, little has changed in the nearly two decades since John
Coffee offered his summary of class litigation: “All that is certain about mass
tort litigation is that it places a heavy burden on the federal courts, while
producing often modest and delayed benefits to plaintiffs.”103
Private disaggregative mass claims resolution mechanisms are substantially
responsive to these sources of dysfunction in aggregate litigation, which in turn
96 See Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265,
270–74 (2011).
97 See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 598. The Court expressly invited congressional intervention, recognizing the
inability of aggregation mechanisms to solve the problem posed by the massive liability created by asbestos
use. Id. at 598–99; Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 865 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Yet, in
practice, this solution too has proven untenable. Georgene Vairo, Mass Tort Bankruptcies: The Who, The Why
and The How, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 93, 95 (2004) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Amchem and its later
decision in Ortiz have made it more difficult for companies seeking global peace in resolving a mass tort to use
Rule 23 settlement classes. Moreover, Congress appears to have failed in its attempt to resolve legislatively the
protracted asbestos litigation.” (footnotes omitted)).
98 See, e.g., Kozel & Rosenberg, supra note 21, at 1879–90; James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the
Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 115, 161 (2012) (discussing the incentive of
entrepreneurial enforcers to bring low probability claims).
99 See, e.g., Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class
Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2000).
100 See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 149, 163 (2003).
101 See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO.
L.J. 65 (2010).
102 See, e.g., NAGAREDA, supra note 22, at 11–54.
103 Coffee, supra note 1, at 1346.
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responded to the failures of single-plaintiff and joinder models of litigation.
These emerging second-generation mass claims structures focus upon
addressing the underlying failures of the single-plaintiff model through
mechanisms other than aggregation, in an effort to avoid the dysfunction
aggregation is perceived to entail. Broadly characterized, one set of
mechanisms bars aggregation in favor of individualized hearings, but typically
substitutes streamlined procedures aimed at reducing or shifting the litigation
costs that necessitated aggregation.104 A second set of mechanisms removes the
common questions prerequisite to aggregation, allowing victims to receive
compensation based upon simply satisfying the individualized proof
requirements set forth.105 Typically, the first set of mechanisms has been
utilized pre-dispute, while the second set is more common post-dispute—but
this results from pragmatic factors, which are discussed in this Part, rather than
from any absolute requirement. Indeed, many structures combine a certain
degree of both of these features, creating a broad array of potential systems
designs.
At a deeper level, both mechanisms for responsive opt-out can be
reconceptualized as insights about the limits of the default rules of aggregation.
By identifying these false assumptions, corporations can craft mechanisms that
manipulate these features of the system, creating alternatives that are superior
for both participants. This Part turns to providing a basic typology of these two
methods, with a particular focus on the systems design choices inherent to both
structures, highlighting the similarities and contrasts between existing public
and private disaggregative systems as they operate pre- and post-dispute.
B. Postdispute Disaggregative Mechanisms
The proliferation of early individualized settlement offers contravenes the
established wisdom that defendants will assert classwide defenses and insist
upon individualized proof as a means of threatening to increase the cost of
litigation and thus decrease settlement values.106 At the outset, then, one must
wonder why defendants would create disaggregative structures, surrendering
the bargaining power derived from delay.107 The impetus for the these funds
lays in the recognition that even in cases with substantial common questions of
104

See infra Part II.A.2.
See infra Part II.A.1.
106 See NAGAREDA, supra note 22, at 11–54.
107 See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 13 (arguing that private defendants would not have an incentive to
enter into early, postdispute settlement regimes).
105
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general liability, the costs of aggregation may overwhelm the benefits to the
parties—making opt-out a mutually value-enhancing option.
In the wake of the GCCF, a variety of defendants have followed the same
model, offering various forms of immediate, prelitigation settlement that
require participants to forgo the possibility of aggregate litigation.108 While
BP’s GCCF was formed months after the Deepwater Horizon explosion, the
delay in formation is quickly shortening: the Costa Concordia settlement grid
was negotiated within weeks, while the Chevron refinery explosion fund was
created in only days.109 Just as defendants are becoming more comfortable
with quickly instituting these funds, a shortened delay in victim acceptance of
these funds also seems to be occurring—the Chevron explosion injured
upwards of 4,000 people, of whom 3,800 sought settlement offers through its
disaggregated claims procedure by the end of the very week the explosion
occurred.110
Skeptics have suggested that these tribunals are simply mechanisms for
exploiting victims, using legal sleight of hand to offer less compensation than
available by law and to avoid transparency.111 There are certainly risks and
disadvantages associated with these structures, which are detailed in the next
Part. But the commonality between public and private opt-out systems suggests
that there are legitimate structural motivations for these innovations.112
The trend toward private disaggregative mechanisms represents a return to
first principles and creates a degree of unity between public and private
approaches to mass claims resolution. From nuclear weapons testing to war
crimes, the government has often been placed in a situation analogous to that
of corporate defendants, confronted by numerous, similarly situated

108

See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, The BP Oil Spill Litigation and Evolving Supervision of Multidistrict
Litigation Judges, 30 MISS C. L. REV. 237, 243 (2011).
109 See Paul Elias, Thousands File Claims After Chevron Refinery Fire, AP (Aug. 11, 2012, 4:39 AM),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/thousands-file-claims-after-chevron-refinery-fire.
110 See id. Chevron’s fund ultimately ballooned to 23,900 claims filed after 15,000 people sought medical
treatment, yielding a total payout of approximately $10 million through its claims settlement fund. See
Chevron Has Paid Out $10 Million for Refinery Fire, ABC7 NEWS (Jan. 30, 2013), http://abclocal.go.com/
kgo/story?section=news/local/east_bay&id=8973226.
111 See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 32, at 825 (reviewing challenges to the legitimacy of the September
11th Fund and arguing that “[f]or those concerned with the rule of law, equity, and fundamental fairness, the
GCCF [created by BP] ought to be a cause for concern”).
112 Cf. Albert Choi & George Triantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification, 37 J.
LEGAL STUD. 503, 504–09, 523–25 (2008) (characterizing contractual predispute substantive provisions as
value-adding and clarifying underlying obligations).
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individuals seeking compensation for wrongs or harms.113 Surely, sovereign
immunity accords Congress greater latitude than private defendants possess in
deciding how to respond to these claims in the first instance.114 Yet despite
Congress’s constitutional role in creating Article III courts, it has often looked
not to Article III courts or their aggregation mechanisms, but instead has
preferred non–Article III tribunals vested with the authority to award
compensation pursuant to a defined statutory scheme.115
Rather than simply waiving sovereign immunity and permitting
adjudication of general liability and damages as defined by background law,
Congress typically substitutes an eligibility and compensation structure. The
same waiver of questions of general liability—in favor of a pure focus upon
the determination of individualized issues of eligibility and compensation—
typifies emerging early settlement offers and funds by private defendants.
For both public and private funds, the structure of payments is a complex
decision, embedded with substantial symbolic value. In a purely retrospective
system, the key stakeholders will typically have a sense of their rights in the
default system and any asymmetries between their individualized situation and
the typical harms of others within the system. The result is that as design
decisions are formulated and established, the stakeholders will frequently be
aware of the impact it will have upon their particular recovery. In both public
and private disaggregation, three general compensation structures predominate:
flat-rate offers, grid/formula structures, and ad hoc determinations by the
tribunal.116 Both flat-rate offers and grid/formula structures can be categorized
as “substantive offers,” while ad hoc determinations are more aptly
characterized as “process offers.”

113

This preference dates from the earliest days of our nation. See Michele L. Landis, “Let Me Next Time
Be ‘Tried By Fire’”: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare State 1789–1874, 92 NW. U. L.
REV. 967, 983 (1998) (describing the transition from “individual to group eligibility criteria in relief
legislation” as based in the growth of the administrative state). For recent examples, see statutes listed supra
note 7.
114 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212–13 (1983) (describing the origins of sovereign
immunity waivers); cf. Gregory C. Sisk, The Tapestry Unravels: Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity and
Money Claims Against the United States, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 602, 611–15 (2003) (noting that Congress
often waives sovereign immunity conditioned upon the plaintiff’s consent to participate in a non–Article III
system of adjudication as to the claim).
115 For an excellent discussion of the constitutionality of these shifts, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1050–51 (2010); and Caleb Nelson, Adjudication
in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 583–84 (2007).
116 See McGovern, supra note 60, at 126–33.
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1. Substantive Offers: Flat-Rate Offers, Grids, and Formulas
Flat-rate payouts, as with the reparations made to Japanese-Americans
interned during World War II,117 are the most streamlined payment structure—
the administrator need only determine that the claimant suffered the identified
harm, without making any determination of particularized damages. Such a
payout system can have an important symbolic effect in valuing each life lost
or harm suffered as equal in value—a critique special master Ken Feinberg
offered in reflecting on his design of the September 11th Fund, which provided
differential payouts based upon a formulaic calculation with some discretion
for modification in exceptional circumstances.118
But flat-rate payment structures inherently fail to distinguish among levels
of harm. For example, the Japanese-American citizen who was interned, and
the citizen whose internment resulted in the additional loss of his home and
business, would receive identical compensation payments despite clear
differences in their actual harms. Moreover, although these compensation
systems are by definition extrinsic to the baseline tort system, participants’
conceptions of fairness are often shaped by a tort-law conception of
damages—an expectation exemplified by September 11th widows dissatisfied
with the earnings caps imposed by the Fund upon high-income earners killed
in the tragedy.119
Private tribunals traditionally operate as litigation substitutes, so the
efficiency and viability of flat-rate offers are typically correlated with
commonality in harm suffered. While this type of commonality can exist in
contractual claims, many regimes need to incorporate either a grid or formula
component in order to distinguish among levels of harm and thus better
approximate the legal value of the claim. For example, after the Costa
Concordia cruise ship ran aground, the cruise line offered all passengers who
had not suffered substantial physical injuries or death a flat-rate payment of
around $14,500, in addition to reimbursement of their tickets, costs of flights
home, and other documented expenses incurred in Italy in the days following
the wreck.120
117 See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 400 (2011) (discussing reparations in the
context of Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).
118 See FEINBERG supra note 13, at 177–79.
119 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Grief, Procedure, and Justice: The September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 477 (2003).
120 See Gaia Pianigiani, Italy: Cruise Line Offers Cash to Shipwreck Passengers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2012, at A11.
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Substantive offers may not only incorporate separate payment tiers to
account for the objective differences among plaintiffs, but also incorporate an
election of remedies, allowing plaintiffs to select among objectively similar
options based upon individual, subjective preferences. The NFL’s settlement
offer resulting from its shuffling of a number of ticketholders into less
desirable seats or standing room only areas in the Dallas Cowboys’ stadium
during Super Bowl XLV exemplifies this opportunity to create added value.121
The NFL offered a tiered compensation structure, which each ticketholder
could choose to accept in lieu of litigation.122 The 2,800 ticketholders who
were delayed or relocated could choose (a) the face value of their ticket or (b) a
ticket to a future Super Bowl.123 The 475 ticketholders who did not receive any
seat were given three options to select among: (a) $2,400 plus a ticket to the
2012 Super Bowl, which they could use or sell in the secondary market, (b) a
ticket to a future Super Bowl, including airfare and a four-night hotel stay, or
(c) a payout of $5,000 or a check for more than $5,000 with documentation
supporting their expenditures on the actual ticket price paid, travel, lodging,
and meal expenses.124
Although the attorney who had filed a class action suit on behalf of the
ticketholders urged them not to take the settlement, third-party pundits advised
the putative class through the media that the deal provided a greater recovery
than parties would receive in court—particularly after one considered the risk
of loss given that the case for general liability “seems very hard to make.”125
Moreover, while the court would be limited to the contractual damages
available, the offer of tickets to a future Super Bowl of the ticketholder’s
choosing created an offer objectively superior to anything potentially available
in court.126 Not only did the NFL offer a subjective value for plaintiffs given
the difficulty in obtaining tickets for a particular Super Bowl, but it also
offered an enhanced objective value given the secondary market premium on
tickets.127
The NFL example highlights the benefits of disaggregation relative to
aggregation. The ticketholders were returned to a position of autonomy, as the
121 See Jeremy Stahl, Gameday Theory, SLATE (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/
sports_nut/2011/02/gameday_theory.html.
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 See id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 See id.
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structure operated on an opt-in rather than opt-out basis. Those who failed to
act would retain their right to sue, in contrast to a class action that would likely
fail to provide relief to an absent class member who failed to file a claim form
while simultaneously precluding future suit. Those who chose to settle were
given greater compensation than available in the courts, without the reduction
in net compensation for attorneys’ fees and costs. And, this relief was available
immediately, avoiding the years of delay common to class action litigation.
Thus, for the ticketholders, the offer was objectively superior to the best
possible outcome in litigation.
The NFL was likewise able to decrease its net payout relative to litigation.
While it paid supercompensation, it saved a substantial sum in attorneys’ fees
and costs and was able to spread the payout over many years rather than
making an immediate lump sum payout, to the extent that ticketholders chose
tickets to future Super Bowls. In addition to these direct monetary benefits, the
NFL also obtained the public relations benefit of appearing to “do the right
thing” in taking responsibility for the mistake and compensating the victims
quickly and fully. Given that the defendant decreased its net payments while
each claimant received more than he would in litigation, without the delay of
aggregation, one might posit that the only losing party in the arrangement was
the putative class counsel.
It thus appears that the emerging popularity of disaggregation results
precisely from its potential for mutually superior outcomes for both parties—as
juxtaposed with the dysfunction and delay inherent to aggregate litigation.
2. Process Offers: Ad Hoc Determinations
While substantive offers are efficient in reducing administrative cost, they
typically eliminate both the need for a hearing—at which the victim can speak
about the loss suffered—and the resulting benefits of closure and a sense of
fairness that may accompany such an opportunity to be heard. Moreover, they
necessitate the creation of an objective mechanism for payment and
compensation, which may entail substantial costs if, despite the similarity in
cause, the particular harms suffered are highly variable. For this reason,
Congress has granted some public tribunals the ability to make individualized
damages determinations. For example, the Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims
Tribunal could make reparations without particular direction or guidelines on
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how to allocate the allotted funds,128 and the special master in the September
11th Fund was empowered to create the compensation structure for victims.129
From a systems design standpoint, this allows for greater accuracy in the
determination of compensation where the cause of the injury may be common
but the harms are highly individualized. These systems are typically more
efficient, as questions and variations in harm need not be anticipated in
advance, but can be addressed on an as-raised basis—mirroring our system of
common law precedent. Over time, these systems typically develop their own
interpretations of legal questions common to the relief, taking on a higher
degree of standardization akin to substantive offers and enhancing the
legitimacy of the tribunal’s determination.130
Consider the Gulf Coast Compensation Fund created by BP in the wake of
the Deepwater Horizon explosion.131 BP framed the GCCF as a full
compensation fund: it would pay out at a 100% rate for all damages recognized
by the Fund’s administrators.132 Full-payout settlements are relatively
uncommon in aggregate and single-plaintiff litigation, as defendants
commonly negotiate for a risk discount for their surrender of remaining
defenses, a reduction to net present-value prices, and even a reduction in
litigation costs.133 But disaggregation does not allow for these negotiations
with an agent—in contrast to the discounts negotiated with class counsel in
aggregate settlements.
Instead, BP needed to entice each claimant to affirmatively opt into its
fund. Its selection of a full-payout rate provided a preliminary assurance to
potential claimants that, so long as the administrator properly determines the
claims payable, they should receive the greatest possible compensation for
their losses—free of the allocational error, diminution for attorneys’ fees and
costs, and delay inherent to the class action system.134 This substantive promise
128 See Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Marshall
Islands for the Implementation of Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association, arts. X, XII, available at
http://www.nuclearclaimstribunal.com/177text.htm.
129 See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. § 104 (2002).
130 See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Unconventional Responses to Unique Catastrophes, 45 AKRON L. REV. 575,
578 (2012).
131 Initially, BP created a claims facility as required by the Oil Pollution Act; however, two months later
this was replaced with the GCCF pursuant to BP’s negotiations with President Obama. For discussion, see
Mullenix, supra note 32, at 833–35.
132 See id. at 834 & n.69.
133 See McGovern, supra note 15, at 1380.
134 See id.
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of full compensation combined with the procedural structure and selection of
Ken Feinberg—the September 11th Fund administrator—enhanced the
legitimacy and perception of fairness for some claimants.135
Although the GCCF was formally structured as a fixed fund, its structure
created very different incentives and efficiencies than Rule 23 fixed funds.
With some exceptions, parties in class settlements typically first negotiate the
size of the fund, only secondarily turning to questions of allocation.136 This
negotiating structure flows naturally from the defendant’s concern with
limiting its total expenditure on the one hand, and the class counsel’s concern
with payment structure, which is keyed to the aggregate amount recovered, on
the other hand. But it is equally a result of the tradeoffs that can be made in the
negotiation process—for example, expanding or contracting the class
definition or scope of claims covered by the settlement to obtain a balance
between the scope of peace granted to the defendant and the price paid.
Although technology has improved the distribution process and costs to
decrease the residual,137 there inevitably remains a balance in the settlement
fund. Courts expect as a matter of course that the residual will be donated
through a cy pres charitable distribution. The return of the residual balance to
the defendant is not permitted—as courts expect that the settlement value
reflected the proper level of damages—and parties, having reached the end of
the settlement process, are reluctant to risk rejection of the settlement over the
allocation of the cy pres. The traditional class settlement thus requires
extensive discovery with respect to the likely scope and magnitude of damages
prerequisite to settlement.
In contrast, the GCCF’s structure did not require this investment of
resources prior to settlement. The Fund was given substantial resources that
currently appear to far exceed the actual damages it is meant to secure, and,
were the Fund to become insolvent, uncompensated claimants could avail

135

See Mullenix, supra note 32, at 819–21.
See supra Part I.
137 For example, in some recent settlements, monies have been directly credited to absent class members’
accounts, yielding substantial cost savings that allow payments to be made to victims suffering far smaller
wrongs than was traditionally possible. See, e.g., Settlement Agreement and Release ¶¶ 81, 87, In re Checking
Account Overdraft Litigation, No. MDL 2036 (S.D. Fla. May 6, 2011), available at http://www.
bofaoverdraftsettlement.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=rxwM1SXyxBc%3d&tabid=67&mid=415 (stating that
the settlement agreement provided that awards for improper overdraft fees would be paid by crediting each
account holder’s account, only allowing a physical check to be mailed if the credit is unfeasible or
unreasonable; the settlement also stipulated a cy pres distribution for the residual).
136
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themselves of the default litigation system.138 This largesse was possible
because the residual of the Fund reverts to BP, and because the payments to the
Fund are structured longitudinally, allowing BP to fund the GCCF with future
revenues.139 This allowed the Fund to be created while the oil spill was still
ongoing—a result that would be highly improbable under the traditional fixedfund class settlement, given the fiduciary obligations of class counsel. Thus,
although disapproved under the traditional Rule 23 structure, an opt-in early
settlement fund can utilize a BP-style fund structure to deliver compensation
much more quickly than traditional settlement funds.140
From this perspective, the waiver of substantive liability questions can
generate a substantial joint benefit sufficient to create a zone of agreement
without litigation or discovery, given that aggregation costs can equal—and in
some cases even exceed—the alleged liability.
C. Predispute Creation of Disaggregative Mechanisms
Prospective waivers of aggregation are premised upon a simple insight: The
aggregate litigation system results in high costs, diminishing net value to both
parties. Eliminating these costs—both the procedural checks aggregation
entails to ensure due process and the free-riding by passive absent class
members—can create joint gains.
Publicly created prospective tribunals present a somewhat different design
challenge than purely retrospective tribunals, because they are intended to
create a streamlined framework for continuing or future harms. Typically,
these systems are designed to promote the efficient resolution of claims against
the government as an employer, as with the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits
Program, Radiation Exposure Compensation Program, Countermeasures Injury
Compensation Program, and Smallpox Compensation Program, which operate
as specialized, public workers’ compensation systems.141 Thus, these systems
usually employ strict liability structures in which the substantive burden upon

138

See Mullenix, supra note 32, at 834.
See id. at 834 n.69, 835–36.
140 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Audit of Gulf Coast Claims Facility Results in $64 Million in
Additional Payments (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-asg-500.html (describing
fund as “a significant advance in disaster response”).
141 See statutes cited supra note 7; see also Peter H. Meyers, Fixing the Flaws in the Federal Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 785, 816–37 (2011) (analyzing the structural features of
public workers’ compensation as well as general public compensation programs).
139
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claimants is reduced and compensation is awarded based upon a grid—one that
often awards less compensation than the tort system would for the same harm.
Prospective agreements between private parties have likewise modified the
compensation framework, but they have taken a very different form. Private
defendants have typically offered supercompensation in excess of that
available in the default legal system—in contrast to the decrease in
compensation common in the public model. Both models provide for
procedural streamlining, reducing the litigation costs to the would-be
defendant and, typically, providing greater compensation to claimants. Viewed
from the perspective of any claimant, the offers of private defendants are
actually superior to not only the default litigation system, but even the
prospective systems created by the government as a defendant.
Why then have these private aggregation waivers engendered so much
opposition?142 The simple answer is that, in contrast to the high-value claims
common to the public system, these corporate provisions have the greatest
value where the expected claims rate will be particularly low. This observation
implicates difficult questions about optimal deterrence and the role of class
action litigation.
One of the predominant uses of class action litigation in recent decades has
been the pursuit of small-value wrongs against large groups, correcting the
underenforcement of claims; consumer claims provide a familiar example. But
the high costs of litigating pressure even defendants that expect to prevail on
the merits to consent to an early, nuisance settlement of a claim. This decision
to settle will occur even in cases the defendant believes are so frivolous that
few if any plaintiffs would have pursued it in single-plaintiff litigation—not
because of the costs, but because of the weak merits of the case. In recent
years, with the increasing expanse of hold orders in the new era of e-discovery,
the costs of avoiding claims of spoliation have only increased this pressure. For
defendants, aggregation imposes substantial costs—whether correctly imposed
for small-value wrongs, or inefficiently imposed through nuisance litigation—
that they would rationally prefer to avoid.

142 See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution
of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1457 (2008); Gilles, supra note 32, at 373; Jean R.
Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1, 5 (2000).
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Streamlined procedural provisions are thus commonly used where a
defendant anticipates claims that few absent class members are likely to bring
individually. Most often, these explicit or implicit aggregation waivers are
embedded in a dispute resolution provision providing for streamlined
individual hearings or arbitration. However, the same result may be
substantially achieved by contracting for forums that fracture the would-be
class.
To better frame our discussion, consider the provision at issue in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.143 The plaintiffs sued alleging that when AT&T
offered new subscribers a free cell phone, it should not only have provided the
cell phone free of charge but also paid the state sales tax on the phone.144
AT&T’s form contract provided that the parties agree to resolve disputes
valued at under $10,000, at the customer’s option, through arbitration or smallclaims court, with AT&T waiving its rights to attorneys’ fees, agreeing to pay
double plaintiff’s attorneys fees, and finally agreeing to pay a minimum of
$7,500 to the claimant if the amount awarded to the customer in arbitration
exceeds the last written settlement offer of AT&T.145 The company sought to
provide more efficient and cost-effective remedies for consumers than the
default system—in exchange for a waiver of the consumer’s ability to bring
claims on behalf of third-party consumers.146 The Supreme Court upheld
AT&T’s provision.147
In its opinion, the Court noted that AT&T’s system permitted the effective
vindication of consumers’ rights in ways that many consumers would
reasonably view as superior to the default system.148 By limiting the scope of
the claim to those who choose to vindicate their claims, the risk of loss for the
corporation is decreased, allowing it to not only streamline procedure and offer
supercompensation, but also make quick settlement offers.149
Contextualizing these provisions within the spectrum of disaggregative
mechanisms, procedural streamlining offers plaintiffs a weaker benefit relative
to other responsive opt-out mechanisms. Pure streamlining provisions reduce
the costs of litigation, converting claims that would be negative value under the
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
See id. at 1744.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1748–49.
See id. at 1745.
See id. at 1752–53.
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default rules governing single-plaintiff litigation into viable claims.150
However, no provision is made for either waiving common questions or
aggregating the costs entailed in their proof. The consequence is to return these
contracting parties to the redundancies and investment asymmetries that
existed prior to Rule 23’s enactment.
However, in these mechanisms, publicly available aggregation mechanisms
function as a default rule, against which the company bargains for waiver. The
result is typically an upward adjustment of compensation and streamlined
procedure for the handful of claimants who seek to enforce their rights on an
individual basis—creating a subsidy by the defendant of the costs entailed in
individual, rather than aggregated, claims resolution.151 In this paradigm,
defendants contract to offer supercompensation to the handful of claimants
who choose to bring claims in a disaggregative system, while still reducing
overall costs to the corporation. As the Supreme Court noted in Concepcion,
these provisions are thus superior for those claimants who choose to pursue
relief—providing a larger recovery far sooner than aggregation would likely
yield.152 Removing both the costs of aggregation and its de facto mandatory
class generates this zone of shared gain.
D. Common Features Across Structures
This Part has posited that the array of unilateral settlement offers and
private claims funds are not isolated one-offs, but instead are part of a far
broader phenomenon. Across the spectrum of claims types, from small-value
claims for defective children’s toys to high-value claims for mass torts,
defendants are increasingly making unilateral settlement offers.153 While
prominent scholars like Samuel Issacharoff have noted that the lack of closure
will substantially limit these funds, this Article posits a far more complex and
nuanced picture.154
Understanding when a defendant will choose to propose a disaggregative
structure requires not only situating these funds within the genus of postdispute
150

See id. at 1749.
Common provisions include corporate agreements to pay the costs of arbitration, reasonable attorneys’
fees, or an incentive payment substantially in excess of the alleged damages. See id. at 1744.
152 See id. at 1752–53.
153 See Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
1177, 1182–83 (2009) (providing examples of recent settlements).
154 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox of
Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397 (2014).
151
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settlement offers, but also the broader family of disaggregation. By
recognizing that these forms of disaggregation share certain common
motivations and purposes, we can, for the first time, begin to develop a more
nuanced analysis and typology of these structures. In turn, this allows for a
more careful consideration of the benefits and potential risks of these
structures.
As the defendant typically proposes disaggregation, we should expect to
see these proposals made with higher frequency where one of three conditions
exists. First, where the defendant expects it can obtain a high participation rate,
substantially achieving closure through its ex post creation of a tribunal.
Second, where the defendant expects that its settlement offer will prevent the
successful certification of a class—whether by dissuading the filing of a class
action or by preventing certification under Rule 23. And third, the defendant
may propose a predispute aggregation waiver where it expects that its largest
costs will come from either small-value or nuisance suits, premised on alleged
violations that few of those with whom it contracts would pursue.
The potential combination of features and structural configurations of
disaggregative tribunals creates an almost limitless set of design possibilities
and structures.155 Yet, while disaggregative systems have been widely utilized
by Congress, given their superiority in efficiently administering compensation,
congressional structures are inherently public in their creation and operation,
subject to the indirect checks of democracy. In contrast, the nature of
privatized disaggregation raises questions about both the existence of
dysfunction in the disaggregative process and the extent to which these
mechanisms further or undermine the obtainment of the public purposes of the
litigation system. It is to those questions that the next Parts turn.
III. THE SPECTER OF DYSFUNCTION IN DISAGGREGATION
Disaggregation stands as a new dispute systems design framework, a nextgeneration system built upon the foundations and dysfunctions of the aggregate
and single-plaintiff litigation systems that preceded it. Inevitably—and indeed,
intentionally—this new privatized system substantially alters the nature of both
compensation and deterrence, rendering our existing analyses in the singleplaintiff and aggregate contexts inapplicable. This experimentation with

155 See Hensler, supra note 58, at 1443 (referring to these as “a dizzying array of potential claims
resolution facility designs”).
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disaggregation thus prompts us to embark upon the creation of a new branch of
scholarship focused upon the assessment of these distinctly unique strategic
behaviors and their fit with our normative goals.
It is already foreseeable that disaggregation will generate a new set of
dislocations and dysfunctions, like the aggregate and single-plaintiff litigation
structures that preceded it. Just as aggregate litigation could not be fully
explicated in a single article—but instead has led to tens of thousands of
scholarly articles and books156—so too the questions posed by disaggregation
are far too broad and complex for any single article to address
comprehensively. This Part therefore seeks only to commence the dialogue
about the instrumental consequences of this new generation of private,
disaggregative dispute resolution mechanisms.
Implicit within this discussion is a recognition of the potential for the rise
of disaggregative mechanisms to radically reshape the role of aggregation
mechanisms in two key ways. First, it reshapes the central inquiry of our study
of aggregation. Complex litigation scholarship has long focused upon
developing a set of mechanisms for aggregate litigation that provides an
optimal balance of autonomy and collective interest in the context of mass
claims, furthering both compensation and deterrence.157 The use of
disaggregation now creates a second line of inquiry, focused upon whether
aggregation mechanisms operate to generate optimal results when employed as
default rules against which parties bargain—rather than as mere ends in
themselves.
Second, parties are crafting systems designed to expand the pool of
resources available for private division between the parties by removing those
systemic features designed to further the public’s interest. The question of
which of disaggregation’s alterations are normatively desirable thus implicates
fundamental questions about the dual public-private role of private rights of
action as mechanisms for the enforcement of public interests.
A. The Compensatory Function of Law
While the savings inherent to disaggregation are a universal driver in its
adoption, the legal and market dynamics differ between pre- and postdispute
156 Shapiro, supra note 1, at 914–16 & n.2 (querying whether any law review existed that had not
published an article on class actions).
157 See Nagareda, supra note 20, at 750–51, 754.
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mechanisms, creating different structures and potential dysfunctions. In theory,
disaggregative systems can offer near-perfect compensation and deterrence,
through streamlined, individualized determinations of damages and the
elimination of litigation costs that distort both compensation and deterrence.
Yet, in the shadow of aggregation, defendants are not paying the net expected
liability to each plaintiff. Contrary to the existing literature on these
mechanisms,158 I argue that bidirectional dislocations exist and identify these
competing pressures’ impact in shifting compensation away from the value of
the expected legal recovery.
1. Pure Procedural Streamlining
Predispute disaggregation provisions are most common where the
defendant anticipates aggregate litigation brought by a handful of plaintiffs,
with whom the company has a contractual relationship, on a claim that the
company believes few class members would choose to pursue individually. For
these defendants, supercompensation can be offered given the anticipated cost
savings generated by avoiding a de facto mandatory class. These anticipated
savings are typically so great that the company is willing to streamline
procedure, realizing that even if the resulting award is erroneous it will be
limited to just a single plaintiff.159 This observation is particularly important as
it reverses the unique asymmetric settlement pressures of aggregation upon
defendants.160 Equally important, plaintiffs are substantially returned to the
world of single-plaintiff litigation, bearing the obligation to establish all
elements of their stated claim and damages. These new dynamics give rise to
the potential for bidirectional deviations from optimal compensation.
In the predispute disaggregation context, terms have often been more
favorable to claimants than required by law, as exemplified by the combination
of supercompensation and fee shifting with procedural streamlining
incorporated in the provision in Concepcion, profiled in Part II.161 But, as
precedent develops in support of these provisions and the minimum

158

See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 24; Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 154.
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011) (“Informal [arbitration]
procedures do of course have a cost: The absence of multilayered review makes it more likely that errors will
go uncorrected. Defendants are willing to accept the costs of these errors in arbitration, since their impact is
limited to the size of individual disputes, and presumably outweighed by savings from avoiding the courts.”).
160 See id. (“Faced with even a small chance of a devastating loss, defendants will be pressured into
settling questionable claims.”).
161 See supra notes 143–52.
159
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requirements for enforcement become clear, the provisions’ contours should
rationally be determined by a combination of market functioning and cost.162
As I have argued elsewhere, predispute procedural terms are uniquely
susceptible to market failure, as contrasted with substantive terms.163 This
dynamic results from the rational decision by recipients of form terms to not
bear information costs.164 This dynamic occurs because the cost of studying the
term would exceed the potential benefit or cost of these contract terms as
adjusted for probability and magnitude of expected risk.165 The full analysis is
complex, but the underlying logic is familiar: if it would cost $250 to retain an
attorney to advise on whether a procedural clause accompanying a $20 printer
cartridge is fair, the consumer will not seek legal counsel.166 As a result,
individuals cannot properly price procedural terms.167 This rational risk-taking
and resulting market failure should trigger a race to the bottom for corporations
with respect to these terms—decreasing the extent to which compensation or
terms offered favor claimants—although, as I discuss below, there are limits to
this race.168
In the shadow of this market failure, private forums have a structural
incentive to favor the repeat-player drafting party.169 The risk of institutional
capture encompasses both the crafting of procedural rules and the selection of
particular arbitrators.170 The public identification of the institutions that favor
corporate repeat players over those whose business model focuses upon
scrupulous neutrality often takes a number of years, as win-loss statistics do
162 For a discussion of current doctrinal trends in lower courts, see Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with
Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly” Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825 (2012).
163 See Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 755–64 (2011).
164 Id. at 758–59.
165 See id. at 759.
166 See id.
167 See id. at 757. For a discussion of the frequency of these form contracts, see Russell Korobkin,
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1203 (2003)
(noting that “nearly all commercial and consumer sales contracts are form driven”); and W. David Slawson,
Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971)
(estimating that more than ninety-nine percent of contracts are based upon form terms).
168 See Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions:
Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 75,
96–99.
169 See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1174–75 (2009)
(detailing concern with repeat-player bias).
170 See Dodge, supra note 163, at 742 (discussing forms of institutional capture in arbitration, litigation,
and the crafting of substantive law); Gilles, supra note 32, at 410–12 (discussing repeat-player leverage in the
context of institutions’ class arbitration policies).
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not distinguish institutional bias from a selection bias in the underlying cases—
a phenomenon exaggerated and further contaminated by the likelihood of
settlement.171 To the extent that structural biases promote some degree of bias
toward the drafting party, this may impact the likelihood of a finding of
liability as well as the amount of compensation awarded.172 Thus, while the
aggregate determination of compensation introduced allocational error,173
privatized disaggregation risks a different type of error—bias in the underlying
determination of the case.
To be clear, having served as both counsel in arbitration and as an
arbitrator, I do not believe that all or even many arbitrators are consciously or
unconsciously biased, nor are all arbitral institutions. Instead, my claim is that
the presence of a minority of bad actors creates pressure upon those that prefer
to operate in a fair system, particularly to the extent that the selection of an
arbitral forum is a low-salience or even nonsalient term for consumers.174
Corporations that take advantage of procedural market failure are able to use
these gains to provide more generous salient terms, or improve profits—
creating pressure upon other corporations that incentivizes a race to the
bottom.175
Thus, one set of pressures suggests the potential for undercompensation,
resulting from the increased probability of market failure. This assertion is not
to say that all terms facially beneficial to the nondrafting party will be phased
out with the clarification of precedent and transition to a more pure market
system. To the contrary, mutually beneficial terms are likely to continue. For
example, the streamlining of procedure is a benefit to not only the plaintiff, but
the defendant as well. Likewise, offers of supercompensation are typically
conditioned upon events that will only occur in cases of substantial malpractice
171

See Resnik, supra note 16, at 109–11 (discussing the delay in identifying the National Arbitration
Forum as a potentially biased forum, in which repeat players “won virtually all the cases”).
172 See Miles B. Farmer, Note, Mandatory and Fair? A Better System of Mandatory Arbitration, 121
YALE L.J. 2346, 2356–57 (2012) (discussing systemic biases in favor of repeat players and resulting impacts
upon substantive outcomes).
173 See supra Part II.A.
174 While a robust literature discusses this market failure, the best evidence of how widespread this
phenomenon is may well be its appearance at the center of a South Park episode’s plotline. Compare Dodge,
supra note 163, at 755–64, 767 (reviewing literature supporting a conception of “ex ante exceptionalism” with
respect to market failure for procedural terms in form contracts), with South Park: HUMANCENTiPAD
(Comedy Central television broadcast Apr. 27, 2011), available at http://www.southparkstudios.com/fullepisodes/s15e01-humancentipad (focusing upon the unintended consequence of Kyle Broflovski’s agreement
to Apple’s terms and conditions without first reading the terms).
175 See Dodge, supra note 163, at 760–61.
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by corporate counsel. Corporations are therefore likely to continue to offer
these terms, as they suggest fairness and legitimacy to those consumers who
review the policy, yet are cost neutral or even favorable to the corporation.
A second set of pressures weighs in the opposite situation, pressing the
defendant to agree to provide supercompensation—compensation in excess of
that which would be objectively determined to be due. For many small-value
claims, removing the specter of aggregation has the impact of making the
claim one in which the costs of defense exceed the alleged liability. The costshifting provisions required to demonstrate that the procedural alterations have
not prevented the vindication of the underlying substantive law exacerbate this
dynamic. A company should rationally opt to settle these cases rather than bear
the costs of defense—even for claims that it believes are meritless.176
There is an outer limit imposed on this settlement principle—where the
corporation expects that offering quick settlement will cause an increase in the
number of claims sufficient to outweigh the cost savings. Yet this will
frequently remain an outer limit and not the ordinary corporate response,
because the small amount in dispute not only incentivizes the company to
rationally settle but also will disincentivize many potential claimants from
filing claims given the opportunity cost even streamlined litigation entails.177
Taken together, these competing tensions result in a substantial shift in the
dynamics of compensation, distinctly different from those of either singleplaintiff or aggregate litigation. In contrast to aggregation, predispute waivers
of aggregation typically yield full compensation for those who file claims—in
many ways harkening back to the compensation available in the single-plaintiff
system. Yet, in order to survive judicial scrutiny, these provisions typically
decrease the direct costs of pursuing these claims, converting claims whose
direct costs would outweigh the relief available in the single-plaintiff litigation
system into viable, compensable claims. Thus, the net compensation available
for the claimant in disaggregation is theoretically superior to that of either of
the existing public litigation mechanisms.
However, streamlining and cost shifting have the consequence of
discouraging the meaningful assessment of the merits of the claim, as the game
is frequently not worth the candle for the defendants. As a result, corporations
should often agree to full payment of the alleged compensation due, rather than
176
177

See, e.g., Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 99, at 1378.
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1761 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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bear the greater costs of even streamlined merits determination. Moreover, in
cases of sufficient monetary value, where contesting the claim is worthwhile,
the question is whether market failure will encourage the defendant’s selection
of a forum susceptible to repeat-player bias.
This also suggests the limits of disaggregation via streamlining. Welldrafted predispute provisions should carve out anticipated claims where the
corporation would prefer to reduce the risk of inconsistent judgments or
seriatim lawsuits—for example, antitrust objections to mergers are often better
addressed in aggregate litigation.178
Similarly, the value of disaggregative streamlining provisions is decreased
with respect to claims that most victims will choose to bring even in a singleplaintiff format—for example, wrongful death claims. The disaggregation
provision would in these cases yield a relativistic benefit for the corporation by
returning to the investment asymmetries of the pre–Rule 23 world. However,
the expansion of contractual aggregation, joint representation agreements, and
MDL mitigate the benefit the corporation is likely to receive—and in turn
reduce the joint gains available for division that are the foundation of private
disaggregative mechanisms.
2. Substantive Streamlining
Postdispute disaggregation typically occurs where the costs of aggregate
litigation, in both delay and added procedural checks, exceed the differential in
aggregate settlement values, such that the defendant can propose a settlement
superior for all parties as contrasted with the default of aggregation.179 But,
given this win-win potential, why do some settlement offers succeed where
others fail? And what does this suggest for the accuracy of compensation in
these systems?

178 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (granting certiorari to review the
Second Circuit’s invalidation of a class arbitration waiver in the context of federal antitrust allegations).
179 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997) (“‘The most objectionable aspects of
asbestos litigation can be briefly summarized: dockets in both federal and state courts continue to grow; long
delays are routine; trials are too long; the same issues are litigated over and over; transaction costs exceed the
victims’ recovery by nearly two to one; exhaustion of assets threatens and distorts the process; and future
claimants may lose altogether.’” (quoting REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON
ASBESTOS LITIGATION 2–3 (1991))); see also David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Simple Proposal to Halve
Litigation Costs, 91 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1727 (2005) (noting that, even in settlement, “on average, it costs
approximately one dollar in legal expenses for the legal system to transfer one dollar from a defendant to a
plaintiff”).
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When confronted with angry Super Bowl ticketholders denied seats at the
game, the NFL unilaterally offered ticketholders the choice of (a) cash plus a
ticket to the next Super Bowl, (b) a ticket to a future Super Bowl plus airfare
and a hotel, or (c) a pure cash payout of either $5,000 as a lump sum or a
greater amount with documentation of expenses.180
In the wake of the Concordia shipwreck, the cruise line made a similar
offer to surviving passengers: a flat rate payment of around $14,500, in
addition to reimbursement of their tickets, cost of flights home, and other
documented expenses incurred in Italy in the days following the wreck.181 The
amount of the settlement was carefully negotiated at arm’s length with
prominent consumer groups, in contrast to the NFL offer’s unilaterally set
terms.182
Given the enhanced procedural legitimacy in the Concordia offer, what
factors prompted the ticketholders to accept the NFL settlement183 while
hundreds of passengers have filed suit rather than accept the arm’s length
Concordia settlement?184 And equally important, what does this suggest about
the viability and limits of postdispute disaggregative offers as a compensation
mechanism?
Disaggregative settlement offers typically seek to generate joint gains
through elimination of contested litigation and, in turn, the necessity of
plaintiffs’ counsel. Yet, without legal counsel to educate claimants about their
legal rights, the legal inquiry into liability and damages is transformed into an
individualized assessment of the acceptability of the settlement offer, largely
defined by subjective perceptions of fairness as defined by each victim.
This transformation suggests three limitations upon the types of disputes
that are likely to generate significant participation in a disaggregative regime.

180

See Stahl, supra note 121.
See Pianigiani, supra note 120.
182 See Barbie Latza Nadeau, Why Survivors Aren’t Buying Costa Concordia’s Compensation Offer,
DAILY BEAST (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/01/27/why-survivors-aren-t-buyingcosta-concordia-s-compensation-offer.html.
183 See Gary Mihoces, Judge: Cowboys Off the Hook in Super Bowl XLV Seat Fiasco, USA TODAY (July
19, 2012, 9:35 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/story/2012-07-19/dallas-super-bowllawsuit/56347366/1 (noting that most fans accepted the NFL’s settlement offer rather than participate in the
class action litigation).
184 See Nadeau, supra note 182 (describing survivors’ reasons for hiring counsel for a class action lawsuit
rather than accept the settlement offer).
181
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First, disaggregative offers may yield low participation rates where
potential claimants, without the aid of counsel, cannot accurately ascertain the
legally available compensation. In the NFL settlement, individual parties could
easily determine their damages—indeed, they possessed superior information
on this point as contrasted with either the defendant or the putative class’s
counsel.185
But in other circumstances, victims may not be able to accurately assess the
settlement’s compensation as against legal damages. Like the Super Bowl
ticketholders, the shipwreck victims had superior knowledge as to their out-ofpocket expenses related to the wreck.186 But, while they knew of the terror they
suffered during the shipwreck and the psychological damage many reported in
the weeks and months that followed, most were unlikely to know the legal
value of these harms.187 Thus, while in many cases, claimants will have
superior knowledge of the facts underlying their particular claims, they may
lack the expertise to understand the value of these claims.
Second, the lack of plaintiffs’ counsel may prevent the effective education
of potential claimants as to legal barriers to their recovery. Because the victims
do not know how to calculate their damages, they may overestimate their likely
recovery. But, it may also be the case that the victims do not properly
understand the procedural hurdles or substantive problems with the merits of
their case. As a result, even in cases where the parties can both easily agree on
the value of damages, if the defendant seeks to reduce the compensation to
adjust for the likelihood it would succeed in its defense, victims may believe
the offer is unfair and refuse to participate.
As a result, defendants may not receive substantial participation where they
seek a risk premium or deduction for statutory or contractual limits upon
damages. Unlike the NFL offer, which was made at the top of the range of
available damages without regard for uncertainty surrounding the liability
phase,188 the Concordia settlement was made in the shadow of legal limitations
on recovery. The cruise line passengers had agreed to a forum selection clause
providing for litigation in the Italian courts, which would impose additional

185

See Stahl, supra note 121.
See Nadeau, supra note 182.
187 See id. (“These people have no idea what their agonizing experience is worth yet. It could take years to
understand the full impact of the experience.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
188 See Stahl, supra note 121.
186
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burdens, likely award less compensation than American courts, and would
require the posting of a judiciary tax.189
In addition, the cruise company alleged that indemnification limits made
the proposed settlement more generous than the relief available in court, even
though it was a substantial diminution as against the typical American
judgment for such a claim.190 In announcing the claim, the company pointed
out that the offer exceeded the indemnification limits—although it did not state
what those amounts were, nor whether these were contractual or statutory
limits.191 The company has made public that the wrongful death liability will
be capped at $75,000, in contrast to the $2–$5 million typical in airplane
fatalities.192 The would-be defendant struggled to gain credibility with the
passengers and, in turn, to educate them as to the merits of the deal. Thus, not
having class counsel created a substantial void in terms of both legitimacy and,
in turn, persuading the victims to participate in the settlement.
Third, disaggregative mechanisms are likely to be most effective for midsized claims: small-value claims will have payout offers so small that few
participants are willing to apply for compensation, while large-value claims
may incentivize would-be plaintiffs’ counsel to take a public stance in
opposition to the deal, suggesting that they can obtain superior
compensation.193 Indeed, in the Concordia settlement, the plaintiffs’ lawyers
urging a class action were publicly asserting that all of the contractual forum
selection and liability-limiting provisions would be invalidated.194
Implicit in this discussion is the recognition that while these structural
features can act as barriers to settlement, they can also shift the substantive
content of the settlement offer. In a traditional litigation paradigm, settlement
occurs where the differential between the parties’ expected outcome at trial is
smaller than the remaining projected litigation costs, such that the costs of
189 See Costa Concordia Survivors Describe “Goliath” Fight Against Cruise Industry, NBC NEWS (July
12, 2012, 8:22 AM), http://rockcenter.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/07/12/12701697-costa-concordia-survivorsdescribe-goliath-fight-against-cruise-industry?lite.
190 See Nadeau, supra note 182 (“This compensation package is higher than the current indemnification
limits provided for in international conventions and laws currently in force . . . .” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
191 See id.
192 See Costa Concordia Survivors Describe “Goliath” Fight Against Cruise Industry, supra note 189.
193 In high-profile cases, plaintiffs’ counsel may publicly urge plaintiffs not to take the settlement but
instead to retain their services. This dynamic is likely to have an asymmetric bias, as only counsel claiming the
settlement is unfair will have an incentive to come forward.
194 See Nadeau, supra note 182.
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continuing litigation exceed the projected gain for the parties.195 Put another
way, litigation costs are rationally borne by parties only to the extent that they
generate a convergence in expected outcomes. This convergence is essential to
settlement, as it is necessary to the creation of a zone of potential agreement—
the settlement range, in which the plaintiff’s projected net outcome at trial
becomes less than the defendant’s projected net outcome at trial.196
Postdispute disaggregative devices are designed to decrease litigation costs,
often through a defendant conceding liability on a particular substantive issue.
Such a concession is rational where the defendant believes it is likely to be
found guilty, such that the continuation of litigation is unlikely to yield a
decrease in liability, but will certainly generate additional costs. But it can also
result where the substantive issue is one whose determination is likely to cost
more than the liability at stake—making it a negative-value defense. The
addition of benefits from a public relations perspective of taking responsibility
or the appearance of doing the right thing, and the provision of closure to the
market, can add further value to early settlement—further increasing the
amount of compensation that can be paid before exceeding the projected net
expense of proceeding through trial.
For plaintiffs, the decrease in litigation costs and increased present value of
a settlement should likewise result in a decrease in the compensation
demanded, creating a bidirectional expansion of the zone of potential
agreement between the parties based upon these net savings. However, a
number of factors counterbalance this diminution in settlement value.
While claimants may have superior information about their individual
damages, in many cases the defendant will have superior information about its
liability for the underlying event at issue. Typically this information
asymmetry is resolved through discovery, but most disaggregative mechanisms
forgo discovery as part of the litigation cost savings.197

195 See Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5–9 (2002); cf. Dodge,
supra note 163, at 778. See generally Issacharoff et al., supra note 86.
196 See generally ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES (3d ed. 2011) (discussing negotiation theory);
Korobkin, supra note 195, at 5–9 (discussing “reservation prices” in settlement negotiation).
197 See, e.g., September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233, 11,237 (Mar. 13,
2002) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104) (“[U]nder the tort system, while many claimants receive extremely large
awards, many others walk away empty-handed due to the requirement that plaintiffs prove fault. In contrast,
the Fund is a no-fault alternative to civil litigation designed to provide fair compensation in a matter of
months.”); Gulf Coast Claims Facility: Frequently Asked Questions, GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY (Aug. 11,
2010), http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/imported_pdfs/library/assets/gccf-faqs.pdf (detailing
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But given this information asymmetry, the defendant’s offer of settlement
suggests an increased likelihood of guilt and thus does not trigger a risk
premium in the form of decreased compensation. Put another way, the cost
savings generated through avoidance of litigation costs should rationally be
distributed between the two parties on the basis of bargaining power. Yet
without counsel to educate victims as to the uncertainty with respect to the
merits of a case and the legal valuation of their damages, defendants typically
offer full compensation in order to obtain claimants’ participation.198 The lack
of knowledge and the opt-in nature of postdispute disaggregation essentially
shift bargaining power in favor of the claimants.
For defendants to rationally agree to pay full compensation, the costs of
litigation must exceed the expected value of the defenses they would raise,
discounted for probability of success of those defenses. For defendants whose
internal investigation has revealed guilt, disaggregative settlement offers clear
benefits. But, as exemplified by the NFL settlement, even those defendants
whose guilt is far from certain are offering settlements that do not just match
but exceed that available by law.199
This trend toward overcompensation is remarkable, insofar as it reveals that
aggregation essentially serves as a tax upon defendants. Confronted with a
class action, defendants’ litigation costs and indirect losses from the
uncertainty mass claims generate are so great that even where substantial
questions exist on the merits, the defendant may still find it cheaper to pay
100% (or more) of damages rather than litigate.
Because disaggregative settlements are contract based, each claimant must
affirmatively sign a settlement agreement. To the extent that only a fraction of
the victims are expected to file a claim, these monies can be redeployed toward
offering enhanced compensation to those that do file. This creates a second
basis for funding offers of supercompensation, which lies not in the reduction
of litigation costs, but in a redistribution of compensation from those who do
not decide to file claims to those who do.
But dislocations can also operate in the opposite direction. Although early
settlement offers have thus far included this supercompensation premium to
that any individuals or businesses in regions affected by the oil spill could file claims with or without an
attorney and describing the minimal documentation required as proof).
198 See notes 131–35 and accompanying text. But see Ackerman, supra note 13, at 161–65; Mullenix,
supra note 32, at 854–59.
199 See Stahl, supra note 121.
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plaintiffs, as these processes gain increased acceptance and legitimacy, this
premium may decrease. Indeed, both the September 11th Fund and the GCCF
obtained the participation of individuals who received awards less than those
available under tort law.200 Put another way, despite the promise of
disaggregation, the efficiencies gained can be utilized to reduce the payout of
compensatory damages, shifting the division of the joint gains in favor of the
defendant. For example, an offer of only 80% of damages is still objectively
superior to an award contested in litigation, given the attorneys’ fees, related
costs, and time value of money—even before one accounts for the opportunity
cost of delay for those plaintiffs facing unemployment, medical bills,
foreclosure, tuition payments for children in college, or any of the other
economic realities that might cause a personal preference for immediate
payment.
To the extent that individuals rationally accept these offers, it risks
underdeterrence by not requiring corporations to bear the externalities of their
actions. It also reduces the effectiveness of aggregation for others and may
even prevent formation of meaningful aggregation, such that parties effectively
revert to the pre–Rule 23 asymmetries and irremediable claims if they refuse
the disaggregative offer.
While in a theoretical sense plaintiffs acting in a unified manner could
refuse the offer, this bargaining sophistication is somewhat atypical,
particularly among a diffuse group of plaintiffs acting independently. As
plaintiffs begin to accept the offer as superior to the litigation alternative, the
aggregation benefits for those who do not opt into the fund begin to dissipate,
increasing the pro-rata cost of litigation and thus decreasing the benefit to
remaining in the class action. This strategy allows the defendant to capture the
zone of potential agreement created by the avoided litigation costs. This may
seem a minor criticism until one considers that the ratio between the
administrative costs and recoveries of mass tort cases hovers around 2:3,201 and

200 See BDO CONSULTING, BDO USA, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST CLAIMS
FACILITY: REPORT OF FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 10, 68, 76 (2012),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/gccf-rpt-find-obs.pdf (DOJ-commissioned report);
Ackerman, supra note 13, at 161–65; Mullenix, supra note 32, at 854–59; David F. Partlett & Russell L.
Weaver, BP Oil Spill: Compensation, Agency Costs, and Restitution, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1341, 1359–61
(2011).
201 See Robert L. Rabin, Tort System on Trial: The Burden of Mass Toxics Litigation, 98 YALE L.J. 813,
820–21 (1989) (collecting studies).
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in some cases legal fees actually exceed compensation202—allowing a
substantial downward departure in compensation from the actual damages
suffered.
Likewise, complexity generates a lack of transparency, providing
opportunities for the defendant to capture gain. In the NFL and Concordia
settlements, the determinations of eligibility and amount of damages were
rather straightforward. Claims administrators could relatively easily determine
who held an affected ticket or had been on the ship, and then review the
receipts submitted to determine the total amount owed. But where these
determinations are less clear—for example, in BP’s GCCF, the calculation of
projected damages for businesses in the midst of a recession—then the design
of the dispute resolution system and selection of a neutral have a far greater
effect on the ultimate value of the payout in terms of both legitimacy and likely
participation.
The nature of privatization typically places defendants in the role of
initiators of disaggregation and in turn systems designers. With defendants
unilaterally selecting the third-party neutral, there is a natural suspicion of bias,
as exemplified by the challenges to the GCCF, notwithstanding the selection of
Ken Feinberg, the special master of the September 11th Fund.203 But for
potential claimants, the information costs associated with investigating the
neutrality of the proposed neutral will likely exceed the value of the
information—particularly given the lack of transparency in arbitration,
notwithstanding reporting requirements.204 Indeed, at present there is a lack of
any such reporting requirements on these very new tribunals, and it is difficult
to conceive of how such a report would be formulated. By definition, the
question is not the binary one of liability, but one of relative compensation—
thus requiring a third party to independently assess the claims to determine
whether the values awarded were “correct” in the view of the third party.

202 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997) (quoting Report of the Judicial
Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation 2–3 (Mar. 1991)) (noting that the transaction costs
exceeded the recovery in the asbestos cases by a 2-to-1 ratio).
203 See Mullenix, supra note 32, at 819–21.
204 See Resnik, supra note 16, at 108 (“The constitutional obligations of ‘open courts’ have produced a
wealth of data on judges’ salaries, court budgets, case proceedings, and outcomes. In contrast, private dispute
resolvers are left to do as they wish, subject only in a few jurisdictions, such as California, to requirements that
arbitration providers ‘collect, publish . . . , and make available to the public’ information about parties,
categories of disputes, time to disposition, and outcomes.”); Sternlight, supra note 42, at 1662–64; Roger J.
Perlstadt, Comment, Timing of Institutional Bias Challenges to Arbitration, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1983, 1985–87
(2002).
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Moreover, because these funds are structured as bilateral contracts between
the defendant and each claimant, they are relatively insulated from public
checks. Absent a showing of fraud, unconscionability, or other basis for
invalidation, the agreements will be enforced. Claimants would therefore
rationally operate upon the expectation of bias in assessing the proposed terms,
potentially triggering a race to the bottom—as purportedly occurred in the
context of consumer arbitration with the National Arbitration Forum.205
This suspicion may be correct even where the selected claims fund
administrator is neutral, given the asymmetries discovered in the awards of the
BP GCCF. As Linda Mullenix described it,
The serious challenges that scholars have raised with regard to the
legitimacy of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund have
even more powerful resonance in relation to the Gulf Coast Claims
Facility. . . . For those concerned with the rule of law, equity, and
206
fundamental fairness, the GCCF ought to be a cause for concern.

Since the publication of Mullenix’s critique, the Department of Justice has
confirmed her intuitions of systemic bias, finding in its audit of the tribunal’s
awards that the average claimant received $8,800 less than the independent
reviewers determined to be due, triggering aggregate payments of more than
$64 million.207 Moreover, the waivers and releases that GCCF claimants must
sign cover not only BP but also any other potentially liable party—a breadth
not provided for in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 but drafted by Special Master
Feinberg, to the advantage of BP and its potential codefendants, raising
questions for the MDL judge about Feinberg’s impartiality.208
Disaggregation awards compensation on an individualized basis, rather
than backing into the compensation due from a classwide settlement agreement
subject to pressures toward allocational error. Moreover, the joint gains from
the avoided litigation costs and delay make possible full compensation in a
way not possible in either the aggregate or single-plaintiff litigation systems.
Yet, the dynamics inherent to a settlement in which claimants decide
whether to participate without the benefit of discovery or perhaps independent
205

See George Padis, Note, Arbitration Under Siege: Reforming Consumer and Employment Arbitration
and Class Actions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 665, 681 n.102 (2013).
206 Mullenix, supra note 32, at 825.
207 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 140 (noting total fund payout of over $6.2 billion to
more than 220,000 claimants).
208 Mullenix, supra note 32, at 843–44 & n.115, 872, 888.

DODGE GALLEYSPROOFS

1302

6/30/2014 1:55 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:1253

counsel create a shift from legal entitlement under the law to subjective
willingness to accept the deal. The inherently privatized nature of this
disaggregation provides a further basis for shifts from the optimal level of
compensation, resulting from the rational strategic choices the parties should
make in the shadow of aggregation. While myriad factors will determine the
direction of this dislocation in any particular settlement, it is clear that
disaggregation creates a new set of dysfunctions in compensation that have
broader normative consequences for the functions of law.
B. Optimal Enforcement and Deterrence
The innovation of disaggregative mechanisms has been the bypassing of
the procedural costs and delay of an aggregate determination on the classwide
merits of the case, allowing both parties to obtain better outcomes than
traditional aggregation. Yet, even if bypassing the merits determination is
rational for the parties, it creates a lack of precision in determining actual
wrongdoing: Both innocent and guilty parties may find it cheaper to pay full
damages to those who file claims in a disaggregative proceeding than to
proceed through class certification and summary judgment.
Yet, unlike in class actions where the innocent defendant can negotiate a
smaller settlement than a guilty defendant, in disaggregation there is no single
agent to negotiate with on behalf of the plaintiff; therefore, guilty and innocent
parties may pay substantially equal amounts to obtain plaintiffs’ participation.
While this is a rational decision for the parties, it closes the differential
between the two competing states of compliance and noncompliance with the
law. As this differential creates the deterrent value of the law, the lack of
merits-based determinations in disaggregative settlements may weaken the
goal of deterrence. But this realization has deeper theoretical implications,
illuminated through two concepts I term “fractional participation” and “reverse
preference enforcement.”
1. Fractional Participation
Private rights have traditionally served not only the private interest in
obtaining compensation for wrongs, but often have also functioned as a
mechanism for the effectuation of the public’s interest in the enforcement of a
particular right. Aggregative mechanisms sought to adjust this relationship,
providing enhanced deterrence against a backdrop of perceived
underenforcement of certain types of claims marked by low net compensation.
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In this aggregative paradigm, compensation became derivative of the overall
settlement and subject to allocational error, resulting in “rough justice” for
class members.209
Disaggregation upends this traditional conception. Parties are not just
putting compensation first and allowing deterrence to follow derivatively;
rather, they are trading enhanced compensation for decreased deterrence.
Disaggregative mechanisms focus on improved individual compensation
relative to both the single-plaintiff and aggregative models, but this autonomy
often generates fractional enforcement as only a subset of victims choose to
seek relief. The significance of this transformation cannot be overstated.
Whereas aggregation focused on correctly assessing the total damages owed by
the defendant but potentially erred in compensation,210 disaggregation focuses
on the individual damages owed to each plaintiff but potentially errs in the
determination of total damages.211
Disaggregation raises fundamental questions about how to define optimal
enforcement and deterrence. Some will likely view this structure as obtaining
the correct level of deterrence, providing compensation to those aggrieved
enough to file a claim in a broader context of streamlining that generates joint
gains for both parties—while preventing the frivolous suits based upon alleged
wrongs recognized by only a few class members.212 Others will likely view this
structure as effectively precluding enforcement for small-value claims, as there
does remain some opportunity cost or burden even in the most streamlined
system. Claimants may fail to file claims even for guaranteed money if
“claiming the $30.22 were to involve filling out many forms that require
technical legal knowledge or waiting at great length while a call is placed on
hold.”213
Disaggregation’s instrumental impact is thus best understood by bifurcating
the private from the public interest. The small-value harms frequently the
subjects of predispute disaggregation are the types of slights ordinarily borne
in society without resort to the litigation system—indeed, “only a lunatic or a

209
210
211
212
213

See supra Part I.
See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
See supra note 89–90 and accompanying text.
Cf. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751–53 (2011).
Id. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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fanatic sues for $30.”214 Beyond making available a small-claims-court forum,
our legal system does not aggressively facilitate the pursuit of these claims,
recognizing the public resource investment as not justified by the benefit.
In contrast, where these small harms occur on a mass-claims basis, the legal
system does recognize the necessity of creating an enforcement mechanism to
correct the incentive for wrongdoing. But the harm to the individual plaintiff
remains unchanged. Aggregate settlements of these small-value claims
historically have not provided individual compensation, as the costs of
administration would exceed the payment.215 Instead, the monies recovered are
often donated to a charitable purpose through a cy pres distribution.216 Taken
together, this suggests that in these low-value cases the true aim for both the
class counsel and the court approving the settlement is deterrence.
Compensation is simply a positive externality of the process, where it is
possible.
In disaggregation’s shadow, legislatures can no longer presume that the
creation of a private right of action will be a substantial mechanism for
effectuating enforcement of the underlying substantive law. Instead, the costs
of aggregation can be leveraged to create a dynamic in which those plaintiffs
willing to seek compensation are overcompensated, while the defendant is able
to benefit from fractional enforcement—making all parties better off as
contrasted with aggregation, but not fulfilling the public interest.217 If the
company is unsuccessful in obtaining a predispute aggregation waiver, then the
case remains in the default litigation system with the potential for aggregate
litigation, with its high transaction costs and de facto mandatory classes. For
214 Id. (“The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual
suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.” (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661
(7th Cir. 2004))).
215 See Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1990) (“When a
class action involves a large number of class members but only a small individual recovery, the cost of
separately proving and distributing each class member’s damages may so outweigh the potential recovery that
the class action becomes unfeasible.”); Notice of Class Action, Proposed Settlement, and Hearing at 4,
Settlement Recovery Ctr. v. ValueClick, Inc., No. CV-02638-FMC-(CTx) (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2008), available
at http://www.affiliatefairplay.com/service/images/post/agreement_of_settlement.pdf (“Recognizing that
administration costs for low-value payments can greatly exceed the value of these payments, no payment will
be made if the Settlement Class Member’s pro rata share is calculated to be less than $1.00.”).
216 See Lemos, supra note 31, at 529.
217 Some may even posit that nonfiling individuals are better off. To the extent they also would not have
filed a claim form or would have received no compensation because the harm was so small as to obtain only cy
pres relief, they receive no less compensation and may benefit from better terms as the company can now
deploy the savings to better pricing or substantive product features. See Dodge, supra note 163, at 755–64, for
a discussion of both sides of the market functioning argument.
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the legislator, the spectrum of potential dispute resolution mechanisms and
their consequence for the level of deterrence obtained makes it impossible to
precisely calculate the deterrent effect a private right of action will obtain.
2. Reverse Preference Enforcement
As with predispute waivers of aggregation, postdispute offers of settlement
are likely to obtain only fractional participation. In contrast to predispute
waivers that completely prohibit formal aggregation, postdispute settlement
operates in the shadow of aggregation. Successful settlement offers will
effectively preclude aggregation, but low participation rates allow aggregation
to continue. Rejection of the settlement may reflect a belief that the offer was
too small for the harm caused.218 But it might also reflect a belief that the
purported wrong was not a wrong at all or not worth pursuing, particularly in
cases of alleged mislabeling or other types of false advertising. To the extent
that low participation rates are a populist rejection of the pending litigation’s
substantive claim, it creates the paradox of “reverse preference enforcement.”
The strongest claims de facto preclude aggregation as most claimants
participate in the settlement, while the weakest claims allow the pursuit of
aggregation and create a de facto mandatory class.
The court’s response to attempts to aggregate in the shadow of a
postdispute disaggregative settlement offer can be expected to further alter the
settlement dynamics. Facially pro-plaintiff decisions with respect to class
action procedure have at times harmed the long-term recovery of victims in
unrelated cases, as defendants reduce their settlement offers in response to the
perceived degree of closure they receive. For example, where courts have
allowed plaintiffs to reopen deals later determined to be disadvantageous to
plaintiffs, but not defendants, this creates a one-way ratchet effect that should
decrease the settlement values.219
The courts’ response to fractional participation may operate in much the
same way. If plaintiffs’ attorneys are able to file class action lawsuits on behalf
218 See, e.g., Pianigiani, supra note 120 (quoting a representative of a consumer group who described the
settlement offered by Costa Cruises as “ridiculous and disproportionate for the damage suffered” (internal
quotation mark omitted)).
219 See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, THE LAW OF CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER AGGREGATE LITIGATION 129–
31 (2009) (discussing the original Agent Orange class action settlement, the court’s decision to grant a
collateral attack on the settlement resulting in a new round of payouts by the defendant, as undermining the
degree of closure received by defendants and thus reducing the amount rational defendants should be willing
to pay in future settlements as a result of this shift in the risk premium).
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of nonparticipants, the defendant must anticipate the potential for a low
participation rate and the costs attending such litigation. Rather than allocating
the cost savings of avoided litigation entirely to the settlement, the defendant
should rationally make offers reflective only of the marginal cost of an
additional absent class member in the suit—a nominal cost, to be sure. Thus,
the creation of a seemingly pro-plaintiff doctrine permitting suit on behalf of
those who do not participate in the private settlement may have the impact of
reducing settlement offers to those willing to seek compensation.
Having identified the shadow aggregation may cast over disaggregation,
the next section turns to exploring the problems this creates for the parties’
private ordering and the second-generation dysfunctions created by attempts of
the courts to correct those problems.
C. Process Function and Legitimacy Values
1. First-Level Dysfunction: Defendants as Systems Designers
No disaggregative mechanism is available within our default civil
procedure system. As a result, if the parties prefer disaggregation, they must
privately create the system. Typically the corporate defendant has served as the
systems designer. Pre-dispute, the corporation includes an arbitration or
dispute resolution clause in its form contracts.220 Post-dispute, the corporation
will typically propose a settlement or resolution process, in which interested
claimants may participate.221 As systems designer, the corporation is then able
to select the type of dispute resolution system, craft the procedural rules,
decide what tradeoff to make as between accuracy and cost in light of the
anticipated magnitude and complexity of claims, and select the neutral or
administering body. The role of systems designer is thus a powerful one,
capable of dramatically shifting the bargaining power of the parties and the
ability to exit in cases of perceived unfairness.222 Moreover, by shifting
evidentiary rules and in some cases even altering the underlying substantive

220

See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011).
See, e.g., supra note 8 and accompanying text; Nathan Bomey, Analyst: GM May Offer $2B-plus to
Settle Recall Claims, USA TODAY (Mar. 26, 2014, 6:40 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/
2014/03/26/gm-recall-claims-settlement-prediction/6930339/.
222 See generally NANCY H. ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES FOR MANAGING
DISPUTES (2013) (explaining, through case studies and other examples, how to design and implement an
effective alternative dispute resolution system).
221
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law, the designer can substantially impact the degree of deterrence the private
right of action will provide.223
This power can often be used to design systems that are optimal for all
parties involved, enhancing compliance with the underlying law, and even
achieving transformative or cathartic ends that the litigation system itself may
not obtain. The new mechanisms, procedural innovation, and, more broadly,
dispute systems design techniques resulting from the grassroots
experimentation with ADR have been lauded for their improved results for
parties across a broad spectrum of methodological approaches—from law and
economics extolling the ability to streamline costs and improve compliance
with substantive terms224 to those focused on the increased party satisfaction
and transformative effects alternative processes can generate.225
But, the public courts serve an essential function in the democratic system,
from ensuring the public accountability of the courts to guaranteeing that the
necessary procedural protections are in place for the obtainment of remedies,
exemplified most prominently by the Civil Gideon movement of the past
century.226 The transformation of procedure from public rules set to ensure a
fair day in court to mere default rules subject to private ordering thus risks
thinning “the substance of procedural due process.”227 Indeed, to the extent that
corporations are able to set the rules of procedure, they can shift the deterrent
value of the law from that existing under the default rules of procedure.

223

See Dodge, supra note 163, at 744.
See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE
L.J. 814, 856–79 (2006) (exploring the impact of contract design, and in particular the selection of the
procedural rules governing a contract, on the economics of litigation).
225 See, e.g., FISHER ET AL., supra note 196 (introducing the idea of principled negotiation on the merits
that looks for mutual gain based on fair standards); Issacharoff & Klonoff, supra note 153, at 1179–84
(emphasizing the importance of the development of settlements in class actions and private aggregations of
cases in the past twenty-five years); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and
Purposes of Legal Processes, 94 GEO. L.J. 553 (2006) (commenting on the roles of different legal processes as
a part of the justice system, including arbitration and mediation as alternatives to adjudication); Patricia M.
Wald, Bureaucracy and the Courts, 92 YALE L.J. 1478, 1483 (1983) (calling for increased accuracy, clarity,
and uniformity in the court system to enhance public confidence and satisfaction in the courts).
226 See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 668, 671 (1986) (“[W]e must determine whether ADR will result in an abandonment of our constitutional
system in which the ‘rule of law’ is created and principally enforced by legitimate branches of
government . . . .”); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085–87 (1984) (arguing that
settlement is not an adequate substitute for adjudication); Resnik, supra note 16, at 134–35 (noting that
“[a]ggregation can . . . be a form of Civil Gideon for plaintiffs”).
227 Resnik, supra note 16, at 93.
224
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2. Second-Level Dysfunction: Public Checks upon Disaggregation
Because disaggregative mechanisms are inherently contractual, the existing
doctrine has generally placed minimal checks upon their usage. By looking at
these mechanisms as a unified system, rather than isolated examples, a number
of observations become apparent that have thus far been lurking within the
shadows of our scholarship and doctrine.
As a general matter, disaggregative mechanisms are subject to the basic
rules of contract and the defenses appurtenant thereto. With respect to
predispute procedural modifications, the Supreme Court has created an
additional protection, given the ability of alterations to undermine deterrence:
procedural modification cannot thwart the substantive enforcement of law.228
Of course, in practice, the majority has focused on whether a person could
bring a claim, if so inclined, seemingly disregarding the opportunity cost of
low-net-value claims, to the dismay of the dissenters.229 The true constraints
imposed upon corporations’ use of disaggregation are then not the direct
prohibitions of the doctrine, but the pragmatic constraints upon closure that
operate in its shadow.230
Predispute disaggregation is available only to contracting parties.
Defendants lacking a contractual relationship with their accusers, as is the case
with many tort claims, cannot take advantage of predispute disaggregation
agreements.
This naturally arising dichotomy has some intuitive appeal: where
parties are entering into a contractual relationship, they have the
opportunity to assess the other’s reputation and their own interests
and decide upon the level of assurance they prefer for their
obligations. In contrast, where the parties are brought together by the
228

See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746–48 (2011); Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636–37 (1985) (“Where the parties have agreed that the
arbitral body is to decide a defined set of claims . . . the tribunal therefore should be bound to decide that
dispute in accord with the . . . law giving rise to the claim. And so long as the prospective litigant effectively
may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its
remedial and deterrent function.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)). In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393; and
E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002), the Supreme Court had also tried to limit the extent to
which private modification court thwart the public interest.
229 See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
230 See generally Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 96 (discussing the difficulty of achieving closure in
mass tort settlements despite the demand for it by both plaintiffs and defendants); Nagareda, supra note 20
(exploring the conflict between autonomy for individual plaintiffs and global peace for defendants that is
inherent in mass torts).
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liability-inducing event, ostensibly without the opportunity for due
231
diligence, a stronger need for state protection is apparent.

Postdispute disaggregation now appears to be on the precipice of a similar
bifurcation. In recent years, corporations have begun routinely recalling
products, creating refund mechanisms, or otherwise offering the relief that
would potentially be—or, perhaps more concerning, is already being—sought
by a class action. In the last year, both the Seventh Circuit and Tenth Circuit
have held that this prevents the pursuit of the class action.232 In Winzler v.
Toyota Motor Sales, the plaintiff brought a state law claim against Toyota
alleging that the Toyota Corolla and Toyota Corolla Matrix had “defective
‘Engine Control Modules,’” which caused the cars to stall with no warning.233
The court held that the voluntary recall filed with the applicable government
agency rendered moot a class action because the recall had already provided
the entire remedy to which the class members would be entitled.234
In Aqua Dots, the defendants manufactured a toy consisting of small,
brightly colored beads; several children ingested the beads and became
severely ill.235 The court held that the class could not be certified following a
voluntary recall because the Rule 23(a) requirement of adequacy could not be
met. “A representative who proposes that high transaction costs (notice and
attorneys’ fees) be incurred at the class members’ expense to obtain a refund
that is already on offer is not adequately protecting the class members’
interests,” notwithstanding the additional request of punitive damages as these
damages would be based upon unmanageable questions of state law.236 As
Judge Easterbrook noted, the “substantial costs of the legal process” offered
little value as “plaintiffs could have had refunds—and still can have them
today.”237 Moreover, there was little reason to believe the court’s notice
campaign would be more effective than that of the corporation—most
consumers had returned the product, there were no complaints by the
governing agency, and it was likely that many of the unreturned products had
been used prior to the recall.238
231

See Dodge, supra note 163, at 776–77.
See, e.g., Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc., 681 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2012); In re Aqua Dots
Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2011).
233 Winzler, 681 F.3d at 1209.
234 Id. at 1211.
235 Aqua Dots, 654 F.3d at 749–50.
236 Id. at 752.
237 Id. at 751.
238 Id.
232
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In a world of fractional enforcement, where a large portion of the alleged
victims may never take any action either in support of or opposition to any
settlement offer, this substantially shifts the overall cost of a violation to the
corporation. The income level of consumers, amount of the purchase, and
extent of targeted notice will be among the myriad factors impacting the
participation rate in such a program. By their nature, these programs are
typically quietly administered and participation information is rarely disclosed,
but the range of ratios of claims form return rates, spanning from 1:5 to 1:50,
in consumer class actions suggests the magnitude of the shift in enforcement
these programs may yield.239 Thus, the emerging trend within the doctrine has
the effect of allowing the defendant to avoid a class action not only before, but
also after the dispute arises.
Of course, embedded within this emerging doctrine are also its limits. But
to understand these limits, we must understand the preclusive effect of the
disaggregative settlement on participating and nonparticipating victims. As
lawyers, it seems self-evident that a company offering compensation would
demand a waiver in exchange. In these cases, the settlement agreement is like
any other single-plaintiff settlement, and can be revisited only upon narrow
grounds such as fraud.
But at times, corporations offer compensation without demanding
closure—perhaps most commonly to comply with a statutory requirement, to
reduce management costs with very low value claims, to increase the
legitimacy of the offer and rate of participation in the program, or for a public
relations benefit.240 In these situations, the company risks a subsequent suit
alleging insufficiency of compensation and seeking the gap between the
compensation paid and the total amount available by law. Because these
voluntary payments will offset against any award, if the compensation offer is
relatively accurate, even with a number of participants, the differential
typically will not be sufficient to justify litigation costs.241

239

See supra Part I.
See, e.g., John Hoeffel, PG&E Announces $100-Million Relief Fund for San Bruno Gas Explosion
Victims, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2010, 1:38 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/09/pgeannounces-100-million-relief-fund-for-san-bruno-gas-explosion-victims.html.
241 The notable exception is where the claims are high value and the litigation seeks punitive damages.
See, e.g., Aaron Sankin, PG&E San Bruno Blast Source Revealed: Company Says 1956 Test Caused Deadly
Explosion, HUFFINGTON POST (June 27, 2012, 3:26 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/27/pge-sanbruno-blast_n_1631550.html (noting that a class action for punitive damages had been filed despite PG&E’s
disaggregative settlement fund and second quasi-governmental victims’ fund).
240
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The closure problem then is not typically focused on participants, but on
nonparticipants. Under the emerging precedent, if full compensation has been
offered, then the class action is not seeking anything not already available to
the nonparticipants. In such a case, individuals are of course not precluded
from seeking individual adjudication or binding together to request an MDL.
But, these functionally remain opt-in mechanisms requiring the individual to
file a claim—in contrast to the class action, where all absent class members are
presumptively included and must affirmatively opt out of the class. Thus, to
obtain the aggregation benefits of a class action, successful plaintiffs’ counsel
will need to argue that the disaggregative mechanism is overlooking some
element of damages or is undervaluing those damages.
D. Constitutional Actors and Disaggregative Mechanisms
Public attempts to restrict disaggregative mechanisms have ebbed and
flowed among the constitutional branches over time. With respect to
arbitration, a vast literature has arisen addressing the shift from congressional
support and judicial hostility at the time of the Federal Arbitration Act.242 More
recently, arbitration fairness acts, seeking to restrict predispute arbitration
provisions in consumer and employment agreements, have become perennial
proposals in the federal legislature.243 But the judiciary has become more
supportive of procedural private ordering, including arbitration, even in cases
in which it undermines the enforcement of substantive law.244
My goal in this section is not to recapitulate this literature. Instead, it
focuses upon the undertheorized problem of public checks upon postdispute
disaggregation. While Congress could restrict the ability of the parties to enter
into bilateral settlements, these provisions are not widespread.245 The primary
form of check has therefore been judicial. Again, because the settlements are
constructed as individual settlements, the judiciary has few tools to directly
intervene in most of these settlements. Instead, the power of the judiciary

242 See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 16, at 112–18 (summarizing the evolution of the Court’s treatment of the
FAA over time).
243 See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013); Arbitration Fairness Act of
2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009).
244 See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v.
Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
245 See Dodge, supra note 163, at 772–76.
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stems from its willingness or refusal to certify a class action notwithstanding
the existence of a settlement offer.246
But what does this transition look like when a private fund is replaced with
a judicially approved class settlement? The most prominent example—and one
that exemplifies the problems with both private disaggregative tribunals and
the oversight provided by the backstop of aggregation—is the response to the
Deepwater Horizon rig’s explosion.247
On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon rig exploded, transforming the
Gulf Coast economy.248 The resulting oil spill continued for three months,
releasing millions of gallons of oil, which forced the prohibition of fishing
through large swaths of the Gulf of Mexico, while coastal tourism collapsed.249
The secondary effects of these economic losses threatened even greater
dislocations and potential economic collapse.
As the “responsible party” for the oil spill, BP had a statutory duty under
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 to “establish a procedure for the payment or
settlement of claims for interim, short-term damages.”250 Initially, this
obligation was satisfied through an ad hoc claims administration process.251
But based upon discussions with congressional officials and the President, BP
replaced its ad hoc system with an “Independent Claims Facility,” later named
the Gulf Coast Claims Facility.252
The GCCF had the potential to generate value for all of the stakeholders.
For BP, the Fund’s structure permitted it to make payments in tranches over
the course of years, allowing for longitudinal cost spreading.253 While the first
$3 billion payment came from BP’s cash reserves, the remaining $17 billion
would be drawn from future Gulf Coast revenues—providing an incentive for

246 Compare In re Aqua Dots Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 752 (7th Cir. 2011) (denying class
certification on the basis that a class action would not provide absent class members any relief not already
offered by defendant), with In Re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr.
20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 920 (E.D. La. 2012) (granting class certification and ordering shutdown of the
GCCF in favor of a new class action), aff’d sub nom. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014).
247 Mullenix, supra note 32, at 912 (“The GCCF . . . illustrates an extreme and seemingly lawless
expansion of the fund approach to resolving mass claims.”).
248 See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d at 803.
249 See id.
250 33 U.S.C. § 2705(a) (2012).
251 See Mullenix, supra note 32, at 834.
252 See id. at 833 n.62, 834 nn.65 & 69.
253 See id. at 834–35.
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the President to quietly rescind his suspension of Gulf Coast drilling.254 The
Fund also served as the centerpiece of BP’s public relations campaign in the
years that followed, a sign—it proclaimed—of its corporate responsibility.
For claimants, the GCCF promised a quick payment to stem any
consequential losses, particularly for those who had the most substantial
harms. The Fund gave claimants the ability to select the most advantageous
system as among a number of options, including the choice of flat-rate
payment ($5,000 for an individual or $25,000 for a company), individualized
interim quarterly payments based upon proof of ongoing losses, or an
individualized one-time payout of all damages.255 These rapid payments were
beneficial to other stakeholder groups, from governments to businesses,
concerned with the secondary effects of the direct job losses and property
damage created by the spill.
Yet, despite the clear ability for a superior payout structure that avoided the
costs and delay of aggregation, benefiting all parties, the privatized nature of
the GCCF raised strong questions about its legitimacy. While many agree that
Feinberg was selected as the administrator because of his unparalleled
experience, including as the special master of the September 11th Fund,256
many raised questions about whether his judgments favored BP. Critics
pointed to the lack of public notice and comment period on the GCCF
structure,257 inconsistent awards and the failure to create transparent paymentcalculation frameworks,258 and attempts to impose geographic restrictions and
collateral source rules that deviated from the available legal remedies.259 Also
subject to criticism was the ultimate determination that the GCCF had
systematically underpaid claimants relative to the payouts the Department of
Justice determined to be properly owing—albeit by only one percent.260
As these questions swirled, many chose to participate in the GCCF
nevertheless.261 Even with these questions at the margins, it offered immediate
254

See id.
See id. at 857.
256 See id. at 820.
257 See id. at 841–42 (comparing the relatively lax promulgation of GCCF standards and regulations with
the more formal processes associated with the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund).
258 See id. at 913.
259 See id. at 861.
260 See supra Part III.A.
261 See Mullenix, supra note 32, at 856 (noting that in the initial “emergency payment” phase of the
GCCF, the facility paid out “$3.3 billion to approximately 251,000 claimants”); Margaret S. Thomas,
Morphing Case Boundaries in Multidistrict Litigation Settlements, 63 EMORY L.J. 1339, 1342–46 (2014).
255
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payout of approximately the amount owing, without the need to bear attorneys’
fees or other expenses, and thus offered a superior net payout. Others openly
opposed the regime as a private, unilateral offer lacking transparency and
legitimacy and filed class action litigation against BP, which was brought into
the MDL.262 Many took no action at all, for reasons that we will likely never
discern with certainty beyond scattered anecdotes.
On December 21, 2012, the presiding judge in the Deepwater Horizon
MDL, U.S. District Court Judge Carl Barbier, granted final approval to a class
settlement addressing medical and economic damages claims.263 The court’s
order resulted in the immediate freezing of payouts by the GCCF, even to
individuals who were negotiating individual settlements with the aid of
counsel.264 This freezing resulted in part from the court’s order that claimants
who had reached direct settlements with the GCCF, without the assistance of
class counsel and in some cases with their own lawyers, would nevertheless be
required to pay six percent of their awards to the MDL plaintiffs’ steering
committee—underscoring the expense of aggregation relative to the
disaggregative process.265
What was the value added from the aggregation? The biggest benefit thus
far seems to have been enhanced legitimacy, as the court approved the
settlement’s terms and the selection of a claims administrator. Yet, beyond this
shift at the top, the class settlement substantially paralleled the GCCF. The
disaggregative Fund’s administrator had paid more than $6.2 billion to those
who had submitted claims,266 working with Garden City Group and
PricewaterhouseCoopers as subcontractors in the claims administration
process.267 The new class settlement operates on a claims-made basis but is
262

See Mullenix, supra note 32, at 871.
In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 910 F.
Supp. 2d 891, 900 (E.D. La. 2012), aff’d sub nom. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014).
264 See Derek Hawkins, BP Spill Fund Freezes Payments After Atty Fees Order, LAW360 (Jan. 4, 2012,
1:47 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/297159/bp-spill-fund-freezes-payments-after-atty-fees-order.
265 Id. Judge Barbier’s decision to approve the class settlement for economic and property damage was
appealed to the 5th Circuit. The appellants argued that due to the potential inclusion of fictitious claimants, the
class settlement did not meet the requirements of Rule 23 and the class settlement lacked Article III standing.
In a decision filed January 10, 2014, the 5th Circuit affirmed Judge Barbier’s decision. In re Deepwater
Horizon, 739 F.3d 790.The court held that class certification is not precluded if the class may include people
who suffered no harm as a result of the defendant’s conduct. Id. at 803–04. The court further held that seeking
recovery for an alleged harm suffered is sufficient to satisfy the requirements for Article III standing. Id.
266 BDO CONSULTING, BDO USA, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/697201241917226179
477.pdf (DOJ-commissioned report).
267 BDO CONSULTING, supra note 200, at 15 fig.1.
263
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expected to pay out $7.8 billion to those individuals who chose not to file with
the GCCF but now choose to file claims, working with Garden City Group and
PricewaterhouseCoopers as subcontractors in the claims administration
process.268 The programs are thus substantially similar on their face, offering
full compensation for those who affirmatively file claims—although the
aggregate settlement will preclude future litigation for those who missed the
January 22, 2013 claims deadline, in contrast to the disaggregative system,
which allowed nonparticipants to retain their claims.
At what cost was this legitimacy obtained? Despite BP’s demonstrated
willingness to settle claims through the GCCF, the fees resulting from the
aggregate proceeding were massive: the court approved an interim payment of
$75 million to class counsel, with an overall cap of $600 million in fees, costs,
and expenses.269 Moreover, as noted above, Judge Barbier sought to charge
GCCF participants for the costs of this representation—despite objections that
these disaggregative settlement participants received no benefit from the class
action, as their settlement terms were those of the GCCF and not modified by
the work of class counsel or the plaintiff’s steering committee in the MDL.270
The lack of legitimacy and transparency is not just harming the parties or
society, from the perspective of social justice. Rather, it is having trickle-down
effects, creating dysfunction in the compensation paid in disaggregative
systems. Yet aggregation’s delays and costs are so great that the over half a
million claimants who filed claims with the GCCF and BP both were willing to
bear dislocations in compensation, rather than litigate.271 This suggests that
both sides concluded that the risk of improper compensation was less than the
benefit obtained from a disaggregative dispute resolution mechanism.
Against this backdrop, it seems there must be a better way to obtain the
benefits of disaggregation without the legitimacy challenges of privatization
nor the costs imposed by the current backstop of aggregation. The rest of this
colloquy begins to address this question, exploring the potential for the use of
alternative public mechanisms to allow parties to obtain the benefits of
268

John Schwartz, Accord Reached Settling Lawsuit Over BP Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2012, at A1.
Cf. Plaintiffs’ Steering Comm.’s and BP Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion for (1)
Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, (2) Scheduling a Fairness Hearing, (3) Approving and
Issuing Proposed Class Action Settlement Notice, and (4) BP’s Motion for Adjourning the Limitation of Liab.
Trial at 7 n.3, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL
No. 2179 (E.D. La. Apr. 18, 2012), 2012 WL 1322258.
270 In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790.
271 See BDO CONSULTING, supra note 267, at 59–61.
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disaggregation, while ensuring that the public interest in deterrence and law
enforcement is satisfied.
CONCLUSION
This Article documents the birth of an entirely new branch of mass claims
resolution mechanisms—radically upending the traditional view that
aggregation was the only way to resolve mass claims. Just as class actions
were once in their infancy, so now is disaggregation. Disaggregation is an
emerging trend that is gaining momentum, and for good reason—both
claimants and defendants can receive better outcomes and far faster than in
aggregate litigation. Yet, as this Article has detailed, purely privatized
disaggregation is imperfect, creating a risk of suboptimal outcomes for not
only the parties, but for our broader, normative goals.
This Article therefore offers a call to a new line of scholarship exploring
the ways in which these new private ordering mechanisms are changing not
only our conceptualization and use of aggregate procedure but also the
enforcement of substantive law and the nature of the private right of action. In
the wake of this transformation, what is the right approach? Should we move
toward increasing use of quasi-administrative actions?272 Should we draft laws
with increased qui tam rights, or create enhanced private penalties mirroring
those of Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.?273 Or is
it time to reform our private mass compensation schemes?274
As I indicated at the outset, my goal is not to answer these questions.
Rather it is to identify this new branch of disaggregative mechanisms,
beginning the conversation about how their existence has informed the
viability of aggregation and, in turn, how the availability of aggregate
mechanisms has shaped the adoption of disaggregative mechanisms. In
beginning this discussion, I argue we must stop seeing aggregation as a
mandatory mechanism and instead recognize the complex feedback loop
operating between the default world of public aggregation mechanisms and the
strategic choices it incentivizes as parties take their first steps into this new
world of private disaggregative mechanisms.

272 See, e.g., Dana A. Remus & Adam S. Zimmerman, Aggregate Litigation Goes Private, 63 EMORY L.J.
1317 (2014).
273 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
274 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 261.

